Securing Space

1. Make space a top national priority.

The U.S. president should demonstrate this commitment by convening a space summit in the first year of his administration and reassessing priorities to include whether to declare key space systems to be “critical infrastructure.” At a space summit, the United States should bring together signatories of the Artemis Accords, leading space companies, scientists, and other participants to reinforce the United States as the foremost spacefaring country. These efforts could emphasize the Trump administration’s commitment to secure space for national defense and global stability by protecting and enhancing U.S. assets in space, ground control centers, launch locations, and receiver nodes.

Regarding critical infrastructure, the Trump administration should bring together industry, experts, and policymakers to address this issue. An April 2024 National Security Memorandum stated, “Critical infrastructure comprises the physical and virtual assets and systems so vital to the Nation that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, or national public health or safety.”43 But despite the recommendation of the Department of Homeland Security, space was not included among the sixteen sectors deemed “critical” in the Biden administration’s 2024 policy review.44

A critical infrastructure designation for space systems would convey immediate benefits. It would signal to the United States, its allies and partners, and the greater international community a commitment to defending the space sector. It would provide—through a sector risk management agency—a unified point of contact within the government to coordinate with industry information regarding threats, events that endanger infrastructure, best practices in protecting infrastructure, and lessons learned from successful recovery and mitigation of such incidents. Other critical infrastructure already enjoys those benefits, which are useful for preventing incidents as well as managing and recovering from them when they do occur. The concept of “sector risk management” implies risk management throughout the entire risk life cycle of an infrastructure asset, from risk analysis and risk preparation to incident management and recovery. Applied to the space systems sector, such an approach would also provide standards for the accuracy, timeliness, and utility of information shared to protect the space systems sector.

The Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, which is responsible for protecting government infrastructure, should work with NASA and the Department of Defense to implement the declaration and to identify potential gaps in the defense of the space sector.

2. Revitalize American international leadership in space.

The president should instruct relevant cabinet officers that the United States must lead the world in space. The National Security Council is well placed to support the president and to guide the interdepartmental aspects of the revitalized national effort to lead in space. The first Trump administration revived the National Space Council, which could contribute focused expertise to this campaign. Declaring space assets critical infrastructure would be a strong step, but it is not enough, because a designation does not bring additional resources.45 The president should therefore ask the Office of Management and Budget to inventory all civil, commercial, and defense space activities funded by the federal government and propose increases in the administration’s budget request. The goal is not only more money in appropriations, but also a more comprehensive and integrated approach to space policy across the federal government.

A real commitment to making space a top national priority would include additional appropriations for NASA and for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and its parent organization, the Department of Commerce, which is expected to take over civilian space traffic management duties from the Department of Defense. For decades, the U.S. military has used its equipment and expertise to provide a global good of warning spacefarers of potential collisions so that they could maneuver apart. As part of a multiyear transition, this service will be transferred to a civilian agency, the Department of Commerce. This change is emblematic of the rise of the commercial space economy; increasingly, the users of this service are space companies. In September 2024, the Department of Commerce announced that NOAA had begun the initial trial phase of the Traffic Coordination System for Space (known as TraCSS).46 In addition, the U.S. Congress could use legislation to reinforce this transfer of duties, an idea that has spanned administrations.

3. Fix the vulnerability problem and enhance deterrence.

In space, the advantage favors offense. As the political scientist Forrest E. Morgan explains, “orbital space is an offense dominant environment—that is to say, it is easier to attack satellites and their supporting infrastructure than it is to defend those assets.”47 Therefore, strategists need to develop measures to deter potential adversaries from attacking a vulnerable asset in the first place. One approach is deterrence by punishment—to make a credible promise of a powerful reprisal for an attack. Another is deterrence by denial—to make it difficult for the potential attacker to obtain its desired objective. Larger constellations and proliferated satellites change the calculations of potential attackers by reducing the offensive advantage.

The president should launch a space vulnerability, remediation, and deterrence assessment that includes participation by the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, the U.S. Space Force, private sector space companies, and representatives of civil space organizations and academic institutions. This type of interdepartmental cooperation that includes experts outside the government is itself an innovation in space policy. Such an integrated approach would reflect the United States’ prioritization of space policy.

The assessment team should produce recommendations for remediating vulnerability deficiencies and enhancing capabilities across the full range of potential defensive measures, including: enhancing domain awareness; proliferating and widely distributing space assets in order to increase their resiliency; hardening space assets against various modes of attack; providing space assets with defensive capabilities; and developing on-demand replacement assets that can be deployed quickly in the event that the initial set of space assets have been disabled or destroyed.

The assessment team should also develop recommendations for enhancing deterrence in order to discourage attacks on space assets by both state and nonstate actors. These efforts should include branding any effort to put nuclear weapons in space as a violation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (signed by China, Russia, and over 112 other nations) and seeking international agreement to ban destructive ASAT tests (like those conducted by China and Russia).

The United States should continue to focus on deepening norms against ASAT testing. Motivated by Russia’s aforementioned November 2021 ASAT test that destroyed its own satellite and spewed debris, the United States led a coordinated response. In a formal declaration on April 18, 2022, the United States committed to not conduct destructive direct-ascent ASAT testing and urged other countries to do the same.48 This policy applies to ASAT devices launched from the ground into space with the intent of destroying another satellite. This category does not include ASAT measures launched from within space. The United States also championed the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/77/41 that called for states not to perform direct-ascent ASAT testing.49 The measure was adopted by a vote of 155 in favor, with 9 opposed (including China and Russia) and 9 abstaining.50 That resolution called on countries to “develop further practical steps,” including “additional moratoriums.”51 For example, the United States and other countries should extend the commitment to include forbearance from launching destructive ASAT tests  from within space as well.

4. Sharpen policy on China and seek strategic engagement on hotline issues.

Even though the United States will need to act unilaterally to deter dangerous actions by China, Washington can make long-term bilateral moves that would improve safety in space. Even as it competes with China in space, the U.S. government should conduct a targeted, space-related engagement with the country on “hotline” communications, space traffic management, and the rescue of spacefarers in distress. With an increasing number of spacecraft and people going into space, the two countries share an interest in rescue, space traffic management, and space debris mitigation; after all, neither wants to collide unintentionally.

The United States and China should develop principles, consultative mechanisms, data exchanges, and hotline communication channels, all in an effort to reduce risks and de-escalate potential confrontations in space. This engagement would resemble the channel of communication the United States had with the Soviet Union during the Cold War and would be in the United States’ interest.

The United States and China also share an interest in managing space traffic, an issue that is only becoming more complicated. If plans succeed, Starlink will be joined by other satellite constellations, such as Amazon’s Project Kuiper, in a few years. Chinese entities plan to launch their own megaconstellations, such as the G60, on a similar time frame. As the home bases of megaconstellations, both the United States and China need to agree on common rules for space traffic management. Countries can have deep rivalries but adhere to practical international rules, as in civilian air traffic. Both China and the United States want to be sure that their airliners can land safely at each other’s airports.

Rescue is another area ripe for cooperation. In the harsh realm beyond Earth, rival crews could find that they need each other if caught in dire circumstances. To that end, one option includes updating the Rescue Agreement. Signed in 1968 as an elaboration of the Outer Space Treaty, the agreement builds on one of the oldest concepts in modern international law, the idea of rescue at sea, and is now ratified by the United States, China, and Russia, as well as ninety-seven other countries. The United States and China need not spearhead the effort. A more viable approach would be for both to support another country’s diplomatic leadership. Negotiators should expand the Rescue Agreement beyond its current focus on assisting astronauts who have returned to Earth in distress so that the agreement also covers search and rescue for astronauts who are still in orbit or on the Moon. As people travel deeper into space, the need for extra safety measures grows. Moreover, as commercial space traffic increases, there will be an increasing need for medical care, as not everyone in space will be a physically fit astronaut. Especially beyond Earth orbit, it would not be possible to return home quickly for medical procedures. Instead, that care would need to be administered while in space. The expanding field of space medicine will likely need to borrow lessons from emergency health care in other extreme environments, such as undersea or wilderness medicine.

To proceed with these practical actions, the United States will need to update and refine the Wolf Amendment, a provision that has been included in annual congressional appropriations since 2011. Named for Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA), the provision restricts NASA and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy from cooperating with China. The measure was originally created more to criticize China’s human rights record than to protect national security, although it has been amended over the years as U.S. concerns about espionage have risen. Currently, if NASA scientists want to work with their Chinese counterparts, they need to notify Congress and the FBI in advance. For example, before requesting access to the soil samples China collected from the far side of the Moon in 2024, NASA had to notify Congress. Ironically, the Wolf Amendment puts the United States at a disadvantage vis-à-vis China by making it harder for U.S. scientists to access material and information that scientists in the rest of the world can easily obtain.

Another problem with the Wolf Amendment is that it reinforces China’s narrative that the United States opposes international cooperation. Of course, the United States should be vigilant in its interactions with a potential adversary. But the amendment should focus on measures to prevent espionage and technology theft. It should include a carve-out for basic scientific research activities, such as communication, the sharing of scientific data, and invitations to examine samples from space. As China’s role in space continues to change, the decade-old amendment should be updated for new circumstances.

A more creative approach would identify new avenues for engagement that the United States and China would find beneficial. For example, the two countries could determine safe distances for activities, such as in-space servicing when a support vehicle maneuvers close to a satellite. This measure could allay mutual suspicions that those activities conceal military purposes.

Another way forward involves the concept of exchange—a powerful idea, since neither side concedes and both sides gain. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union created the Apollo-Soyuz program, which led to a historic docking in space in 1975. Borrowing from the past, the United States and China could hold a joint conference of American astronauts and Chinese taikonauts that focuses on the importance of rescue on the ground. This would serve as a starting point for cooperation between the countries, which could lead to deeper conversations addressing rescue in space, including interoperability of equipment. Additionally, the United States could suggest establishing a joint research lab, where scientists from both countries could investigate samples from the Moon.

In a more ambitious move, the United States could propose an exchange of astronauts and taikonauts, allowing each to fly on the other’s space station. China would allow American astronauts to visit the Tiangong space station, and the United States would allow Chinese taikonauts to visit the ISS before its planned retirement in 2030. There is little security risk in opening up the ISS to Chinese participation: as of October 2024, NASA reports that “280 individuals representing 23 countries, and 5 International Partners have visited the International Space Station.”52 Of those, fifty-seven were Russian. Reflecting the post–Cold War era of cooperation, the ISS was intentionally built with a Russian component. Russian participation has continued despite the war in Ukraine, reinforcing the point that life-sustaining cooperation in space can transcend disagreements on Earth. A U.S.-China exchange initiative could improve civil space relations and help sustain practical cooperation on space traffic management.

5. Build on existing international regimes to improve space traffic management.

As there is no single comprehensive organization for managing space, the Task Force recommends building on existing international organizations to create a new web of cooperation. This system would be based on UNOOSA and the ITU. To that end, there are steps that the United States and other countries should take. This section begins with top priorities and then explores more detailed descriptions of the recommended bodies and structures.

Expand the Artemis Accords. Established under the first Trump administration, the Artemis Accords have over fifty signatories. To unleash the power of this set of principles governing the use of space, the State Department should further develop an Artemis Accords coordination group composed of officials and experts who work together to advance shared principles. A group of Artemis Accord countries met on the margins of the 2024 International Astronautical Conference.53 As Michael Gold, a former associate administrator of NASA, has said: “The accords were designed to be a beginning of a discussion, not an ending. They have been tremendously effective in creating momentum for the dialog and norms of behavior in venues like the United Nations involving China and Russia.”54 The Artemis Accords advance useful principles such as interoperability, and they call on “partner nations to utilize open international standards, develop new standards when necessary, and strive to support interoperability to the greatest extent practical.”55

Offer lessons learned about aspects of space management. The ITU could provide lessons learned from its decades of work on spectrum allocation, which could inform the deconfliction of LEO orbits and issuance of debris mitigation guidelines. The ITU already allocates frequencies and orbital positions for satellites in GEO and frequencies for satellites in LEO. The ITU could analyze which, if any, aspects of managing GEO provide insights for promoting safety in the very different setting of LEO. Currently, countries assign LEO orbital positions when granting a license to launch, but this is a national process. There is currently no dedicated international mechanism to deconflict overlapping allocations. Unlike in GEO, where geosynchronous satellites in effect stay over a fixed spot, the movement of satellites in LEO might be changed, making allocation of location difficult. 

Assist spacefaring states. UNOOSA, with its power to convene groups and gather and disseminate information to COPUOS members and the public, is well placed to help states and other parties meet international standards for safe operation in space. Therefore, it should expand its resources for new spacefaring states. It can help states build their capacity for meeting standards of good practice. Furthermore, governments could be more willing to receive advice from UNOOSA, a theoretically apolitical office within the UN Secretariat, than they would directly from other governments. The United States should support the allocation of resources within the UN budget to enhance UNOOSA’s capacities.

Participate actively. Neither international organizations nor more informal international regimes function well without sustained attention from their members. Active participation by the United States and its friends and allies in these international organizations will be critical to ensuring that they effectively carry out the tasks given to them. The United States is well placed to be a constructive leader. The United States should continue to take an active role in the international organizations that help manage space.

Working through existing organizations is an option, for now. Given the current geopolitical climate, it is neither politically nor economically feasible to create a new formal international organization for space, which would require negotiating and ratifying a new treaty. Future diplomats, however, may want to revisit this approach and craft a new organization to support cooperation in space.

In the meantime, policymakers should craft regimes of cooperation on space issues that use existing organizations. Some tasks involve grappling with new technology and need a small group of technical experts to confer and agree. Other tasks involve disseminating new practices or information and require an organization that can spread ideas widely, enjoys far-reaching credibility and political acceptance, and has a broad membership. Thus, different types of organizations should be used for different tasks. Functional international organizations such as ICAO, the IMO, and the World Meteorological Organization provide managerial frameworks for their specific fields of activity. If and until the world creates a new functional international organization for space management, space policy practitioners will have to make do with borrowing the best of existing organizations. Two organizations should serve as pillars: UNOOSA and the ITU.

UNOOSA already has connections with a wide range of countries in different regions of the world. The office maintains the Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space, which lists who has launched what type of craft, making the office a logical body to provide assistance to new spacefaring states. Spacefaring states should inform UNOOSA about launches from their territory. UNOOSA could act as the repository of informational materials that help new spacefaring states meet international requirements. This capacity-building would give all states a stake in space governance, which could reduce the odds that the equivalent to merchant ships’ “flags of convenience” emerge in space, kicking off a race to the bottom as countries compete to offer lower standards. Smaller spacefaring states may feel they have a voice in COPUOS, which adds to the legitimacy of space governance. All states need to recognize that space governance is beneficial not just for the major spacefaring countries but also for emerging and even non-spacefaring countries. Of course, COPUOS faces challenges, since its consensus decision-making rule means any of its 102 members can block action. The flip side to the consensus rule, however, is that all states are on an equal footing, making COPUOS (and UNOOSA) broadly acceptable to a wide range of countries.

UNOOSA also benefits from the somewhat less politicized atmosphere of being based with other UN technical agencies in Vienna. That makes it easier for governments, companies, researchers, and other entities to participate effectively. Inclusion is crucial, since standards for space operations, especially regarding traffic management, need to be followed by everyone if they are to be effective. Most of the over ninety countries that own satellites in LEO are new spacefaring countries (see figure below).56 Providing capacity-building or facilitating the exchange of practical practices would be a classic task for a functional office such as UNOOSA. UNOOSA has taken the initiative to include private sector speakers in gatherings such as the June 2024 Conference on Sustainable Lunar Activities, hosted by UNOOSA Director Aarti Holla-Maini. UNOOSA does not have a large staff, but it can help new spacefaring states with existing projects, as it already does with its Space Law for New Space Actors project. The project, on request, helps governments update their domestic law on space to meet international norms. At UNOOSA, member states could boost the organization’s capacity (and their own influence) by loaning experts to support the international staff. Today, the United States lends one official to UNOOSA. Another innovation would be to allow member states to loan more experts up to a limit, such as five per country.

The space economy moves at the pace of innovation, and the institutions that support it need to move quickly as well. Practical structural improvements could help COPUOS support countries and companies better. For example, currently COPUOS has one two-week plenary session in June leading up to the UN General Assembly in the fall. Many innovators in the space economy do not think COPUOS can act quickly enough to offer solutions to rapidly changing conditions in LEO, making them wary of working with this committee. Member states should increase the pace and convene plenaries twice a year. COPUOS also has two subcommittees that each meet once a year. Having these bodies meet more frequently could also help COPUOS be more responsive.

The ITU should also take on a greater role in space. The organization has a membership composed of states and is empowered to make decisions by a majority vote instead of consensus. The ITU has mechanisms to incorporate private sector expertise into its decision-making process—all of which make the ITU well placed to recommend actions that governments and other actors should take with regard to space. Already, the ITU maintains the Master International Frequency Register, which lists who has been allocated which frequency.57 The ITU could consider new ideas, such as developing a tracking device for satellites similar to the Automatic Identification System transponder on ships.

The ITU and UNOOSA need the support of UN member states to help manage human activity in the space domain. With adequate funding and diplomatic support, these international organizations can not only draw attention to space issues but also serve as a forum in which states can craft agreements. The principal space treaties, for example, were developed in COPUOS meetings in the 1960s and 1970s.58

Another benefit of working through international organizations such as these is that many different member states can provide leadership on an issue; the burden does not just fall on powerful countries like the United States. In the space sector, several countries have relevant experience that can be drawn upon, while others have strong track records of bridging differences to bring states together. At a time of rising geopolitical tensions, it can be advantageous for less powerful countries to take the lead. In 2024, for example, Romania played an important role leading the successful effort to create an Action Team on Lunar Activities Consultation, which will help frame diplomatic discussions on how to manage increasing human activity on the Moon. In multilateral organizations, such groups can help define policy options that are both inventive and politically viable.59

Of course, the United States should make sure that new obligations do not hamper private companies’ innovation in space. The United States depends on such innovation continuing in order to deliver and maintain its own advanced space capabilities. Policymakers should also make sure that any new obligations are not used by foreign actors, intentionally or not, to hamper the U.S. space industry. Effective governance and rapid innovation need not be in opposition, but maintaining balance between the two requires careful policymaking.

6. Incorporate the commercial sector and other relevant nonstate actors.

It is not just governmental organizations that should play a role in managing space; the expertise and perspective of the private sector and other nonstate actors is also critical. The question of how to integrate the expertise of the private sector and nonstate actors into international organizations with a regulatory-style remit is not new. Many of the UN technical agencies set rules that commercial or private entities must follow. This is the case with ICAO and airlines, the IMO and shipping companies, and the Universal Postal Union and delivery companies.

To include private sector expertise in space traffic management, two formats look promising: an advisory group and a companion association.

Advisory group. The United States, with its partners, should lead efforts to establish a regularly scheduled forum or advisory group that channels relevant expertise from the commercial sector, civil society, and academic experts into the deliberations of responsible organizations and diplomatic efforts involving space traffic management. The United States has a long tradition of including expert private sector advisors within its own diplomatic delegations to UN functional agencies and does so at COPUOS. Policymakers could borrow from civil aviation. ICAO also has a formal Air Navigation Commission (ANC) composed of nineteen experts, which could be a model for a new permanent UNOOSA advisory function. As ICAO explains: “Although ANC Commissioners are nominated by specific ICAO Member States, and appointed by the Council, they do not represent the interest of any particular State or Region. Rather they act independently and utilize their expertise in the interest of the entire international civil aviation community.”60

Companion association. Cooperation inside an international organization can be reinforced by a companion association. This could be designed to focus on specific issues so as to supplement, not duplicate, existing entities. Such a mechanism is particularly useful in situations in which engaging the private sector is important. This group does not need to be a formal intergovernmental entity; instead, it could be a gathering of countries, companies, experts, and other organizations.

One model for a companion association is the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the trade association for airlines, which works with airlines to implement ICAO’s operational recommendations.61 Although much of IATA’s focus over the decades has been fares, in its early years, the IATA worked closely with the ICAO on air traffic safety.62 The two organizations were intentionally located in the same city (Montreal, Canada). Today’s quest to help the space industry expand safely echoes the task of setting standards for the growing airline industry decades ago.

Another model is the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF), which is led by governments and was convened in 2023. It provides a venue for high-level candid conversations among stakeholders before or during formal sessions of an international conference. Such an example could be expanded to include companies.

Finally, there is the Green Diplomacy Network, which the European Union spearheaded leading up to the Paris Climate Change Agreement (COP21) by using issue-focused diplomatic coordination in capitals. A more dynamic option would be to create a companion association among the most innovative countries and nonstate actors that could experiment with new ideas on space traffic management before expanding the more successful ideas to a larger group.

Whatever approach is taken, a new space companion association could take a number of actions, drawing on elements of IATA, the MEF, and the Green Diplomacy Network. It could convene national policymakers, resident diplomats, companies, and other nonstate actors in multiple capitals to confer in advance of major space decision-making conferences hosted by the ITU or UNOOSA. For example, the groups could convene every spring before the plenary session of COPUOS, held in June, and could start planning now to hold a series of meetings, beginning in 2025, to strategize in advance of the 2027 WRC.

To be effective, space management policies need to be discussed widely and deemed acceptable in different parts of the world. To that end, the new solutions developed by the companion organization could be discussed in the Group of Twenty (G20), whose members include spacefaring countries from different regions of the world. The existing G20 Space Economy Leaders Meeting, which has met in conjunction with G20 summits for five years, might provide the right context. Existing regional organizations could also provide useful venues. The African Union Commission will launch the African Space Agency in 2025, which could be another venue for such discussions.

7. Treat space as global commons.

The right to sail on the high seas beyond national jurisdiction is one of the oldest concepts in modern international relations. Accordingly, the United States should recognize space as a commons where all have a right to go—and encourage other states to do so as well.

Much like the high seas, outer space is beyond the ownership of any person, company, or government. This position is consistent with Article II of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which provides that outer space (including celestial bodies) “is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”

Major spacefaring countries, including China, Japan, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have ratified this foundational treaty. But of the ninety-six countries with objects orbiting in space (see figure below), seventeen are not party to it.63 For example, Djibouti is not a party to the Outer Space Treaty but is building an international commercial spaceport with a Chinese company, Hong Kong Aerospace Technology Group. Djibouti’s geographical position close to the equator makes it a desirable launch location. Furthermore, a slightly different set of sixteen members of COPUOS are not party to the Outer Space Treaty.64 Many countries, including the United States, require ratification by their legislature for a signed treaty to enter into force.

The Task Force thus recommends that all member states of the United Nations sign and ratify the Outer Space Treaty. All spacefaring states that are parties to the treaty should encourage their partners to follow suit. The norm should now be that if a state has a satellite or other item in space, or hosts a space launch site, it should be a party to the Outer Space Treaty. Eventually, that norm should expand to the point where even states that do not have items in space feel compelled to become a party.

As part of its space diplomacy, the United States could work with allies, other partners, and new spacefaring countries to improve space traffic management. In addition to its cooperation in large multilateral settings, the United States should continue to expand space diplomacy with allies and friends in other venues or configurations. The United States does not have to lead every effort. Consider the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) grouping, which marked its tenth anniversary in September 2024. CSpO brings together Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States to improve “cooperation and coordination of national security space activities.”65

The AUKUS allies (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have extended their cooperation into space activities. In 2023, they announced plans for the Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability, a program to enhance their ability to identify and track objects in space.66 The United States should continue to expand inclusion of space in U.S. diplomacy.

Policymakers can bolster U.S. diplomacy by embracing the global commons concept. Differentiating between the “use” and “ownership” of the commons can help clarify application of the term. Scholar John Goehring differentiates between the concept of a commons as “enabling” versus “constraining.” He notes, “referring to a global commons in a military or geopolitical context implies a focus on the use of an open access domain and, when used accurately, the lack of ownership is a settled question.”67  Some policymakers reject the idea of a “commons” because they fear that the concept is “constraining” and precludes extraction and ownership of resources.

However, space is beyond national jurisdiction, and all have a right of access. Civil aviation rules recognize national airspace only up to sixty thousand feet above mean sea level. Well above that level is the “Kármán line” at sixty-two miles above mean sea level, which is widely recognized as the end of the atmosphere and the beginning of space. Thus, the centuries-old concept of the high seas as a commons is enabling—everyone has a right to sail there.

Treating space as a global commons is both expedient and the right thing to do. In addition, by protecting the space interests of developing countries that are not now major spacefaring nations, U.S. advocacy of space as global commons would be popular with the nations of the Global South, adding to U.S. soft power and serving as a useful tool in the competition with China.

• 43

  White House, National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, by Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (Washington: 2024), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/04/30/national-security-memorandum-on-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/. 

• 44

  Brian E. Humphreys, “The 2024 National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” Congressional Research Service, IF12716, July 25, 2024, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12716.

• 45

  Eric Fanning, “AIA Critical Infrastructure Letter,” Aerospace Industries Association, September 19, 2023, https://www.aia-aerospace.org/publications/aia-critical-infrastructure-letter/.

• 46

  NOAA Office of Space Commerce, “Commerce Department’s New Traffic Coordination System for Space Launches Initial Capabilities,” news release, September 30, 2024, https://www.space.commerce.gov/commerce-departments-new-traffic-coordination-system-for-space-launches-initial-capabilities/. 

• 47

  Forrest E. Morgan, “Deterring Attacks on Space Systems,” in The Oxford Handbook of Space Security, eds. Saadia M. Pekkanen and P. J. Blount (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2024), 204–22, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197582671.013.32.

• 48

  The White House, “FACT SHEET: Vice President Harris Advances National Security Norms in Space,” press release, April 18, 2022, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fact-sheet-vice-president-harris-advances-national-security-norms-space. 

• 49

  UN General Assembly, Resolution 77/41, Destructive Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Missile Testing, A/RES/77/41 (December 7, 2022), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3996915?ln=en.

• 50

  “Destructive Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Missile Testing: Resolution / Adopted by the General Assembly,” UN Digital Library, December 7, 2022, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3996915?ln=en.

• 51

  UN General Assembly, Resolution 77/41.

• 52

  “Station Visitors,” NASA, accessed October 14, 2024, https://www.nasa.gov/international-space-station/space-station-visitors-by-country/.

• 53

  Amber Jacobson and Elizabeth Shaw, “NASA, Artemis Accords Signatories Progress on Sustainable Exploration,” NASA, accessed January 28, 2025, https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-artemis-accords-signatories-progress-on-sustainable-exploration/. 

• 54

  Richard Luscombe, “How Nasa’s Artemis Accords Are Laying the Ground for Global Space Cooperation,” The Guardian, October 20, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/science/2024/oct/20/nasa-artemis-accords-space-diplomacy.

• 55

  “The Artemis Accords,” NASA, accessed December 13, 2024, https://www3.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/. 

• 56

  United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer Space,” accessed October 2024, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/osoindex/search-ng.jspx?lf_id=.

• 57

  “WRS-22: Regulation of Satellites in Earth’s Orbit,” ITU News, January 2, 2023, https://www.itu.int/hub/2023/01/satellite-regulation-leo-geo-wrs/. 

• 58

  Four of the five treaties have been widely ratified: the “Outer Space Treaty,” the “Rescue Agreement,” the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the “Liability Convention”), and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the “Registration Convention”). The fifth, the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Moon Agreement”), has not been widely ratified by major space powers. “Space Law Treaties and Principles,” UNOOSA, accessed January 22, 2025, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html.

• 59

  “Statement of the Delegation of Romania: Agenda Item 5: General Exchange of Views,” transcript of speech delivered at sixty-seventh session of COPUOS, Vienna, Austria, June 28, 2024, https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/2024/statements/5_Romania.pdf.

• 60

  “Air Navigation Commission,” ICAO, accessed August 25, 2024, https://www.icao.int/about-icao/AirNavigationCommission/Pages/default.aspx.

• 61

  IATA, “IATA & ICAO Extend Cooperation on Standards for Dangerous Goods Shipments,” news release, January 22, 2024, https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/2024-releases/2024-01-22-01/.

• 62

  IATA, “Early Days,” accessed October 16, 2024, https://www.iata.org/en/about/history/history-early-days/.

• 63

  Taiwan signed the Outer Space Treaty in 1967 and ratified it in 1970. However, after the 1971 UN General Assembly vote recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the representative of China, Taiwan is no longer counted as a signatory. However, Taiwan does launch satellites into space from launch pads in other countries. As of October 16, 2024, the seventeen spacefaring non-parties to the Outer Space Treaty are Angola, Bhutan, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Iran, Jordan, Latvia, Malaysia, Moldova, Monaco, Philippines, Rwanda, Taiwan, and Turkmenistan. Some countries have signed but not yet ratified the treaty, including Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Philippines, and Rwanda.

• 64

  COPUOS members who are not party to the Outer Space Treaty as of October 16, 2024, include: Albania, Angola, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chad, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, and Sudan. Many countries have a two-step process in which diplomats negotiate and sign a treaty then later a national legislature must approve it to legally bind the state to follow the terms of the treaty.

• 65

  U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Statement From the Combined Space Operations Initiative.”

• 66

  U.S. Space Force, “US, UK, Australia announce trilateral Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability initiative,” news release, December 2, 2023, https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3604036/us-uk-australia-announce-trilateral-deep-space-advanced-radar-capability-initia/.

• 67

  John S. Goehring, “Why Isn’t Outer Space a Global Commons?,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy 11, no. 3 (September 2021): 580, https://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Why_Isnt_Outer_Space_a_Global_Commons_2.pdf.

Policymakers in the United States and elsewhere need to recognize the strategic imperative to address the challenge of congestion and new vulnerabilities in space and make decisions now. In the coming years, more and more satellite constellations will be launched, increasing congestion in LEO. Decisions made now will affect human activity in space for years to come.

The United States must make space a top national priority and commit to revitalizing U.S. leadership in space. Advancing space management policy should be a priority for both the executive and legislative branches of government, and national leaders need to work together to fix vulnerabilities and enhance deterrence. On China, the United States will need to find effective ways to cooperate with its chief competitor to improve basic space traffic management and space safety. For now, the United States can advance an international regime of norms and standards of best practice by building on existing international organizations, forming new advisory and support mechanisms, and incorporating the private sector and other nonstate actors in space traffic management.

Dynamic companies continue to offer innovative services to more customers, but they need an orderly process for avoiding collisions in space. The space economy needs a peaceful and predictable environment, and humanity needs powerful countries to make responsible choices. The threat of miscalculation is real. The United States, China, Russia, and other spacefaring countries need clear ways to communicate their intentions. Well-managed space diplomacy can provide those communication channels. The expanding space economy and strategic calculations benefit from effective diplomacy. Despite some understandable private sector concerns about inefficient bureaucracies, creating rules of the road does not need to hamper innovation. Advances in services from space can improve life on Earth. Better rules of the road can help humanity enjoy those benefits safely.

While the new space economy needs strategic stability to thrive, people on Earth need strategic stability to survive. The United States is uniquely placed at the intersection of changing commercial, scientific, and national security needs. The United States must make space a priority now and focus on responsible leadership in humanity’s newest domain.