The Evolution of U.S.–Vietnam Ties

The Evolution of U.S.–Vietnam Ties

U.S. President Donald J. Trump welcomes Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc at the White House, Washington, DC.
U.S. President Donald J. Trump welcomes Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc at the White House, Washington, DC. Kevin Lamarque/Reuters

Once locked in war, Vietnam and the United States have built mature ties rooted in mutual economic and security interests.

Last updated March 20, 2019 8:00 am (EST)

U.S. President Donald J. Trump welcomes Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc at the White House, Washington, DC.
U.S. President Donald J. Trump welcomes Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc at the White House, Washington, DC. Kevin Lamarque/Reuters
Backgrounder
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Introduction

Four decades after the end of the Vietnam War, the relationship between the United States and Vietnam has changed remarkably. The former adversaries have pushed past their turbulent history to forge strong trade linkages and security cooperation in recent years. This rapprochement, as well as Vietnam’s efforts to court other Asia-Pacific powers, such as India and Japan, have largely been driven by Vietnam’s concerns about Chinese primacy in the region, particularly its assertive behavior in the South China Sea. Given the dynamics, analysts expect Vietnam and the United States to foster a deeper partnership in the years ahead. However, the relationship faces constraints, including Hanoi’s state-led capitalism and its residual distrust of Washington.

Emerging From War

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Vietnam declared its independence from French colonial rule in 1945 after Japan’s occupation ended with its surrender to the Allies. This set the stage for the First Indochina War (1946–1954). In 1950, Vietnamese forces in Hanoi were recognized by China and Russia, while the United States and the United Kingdom recognized the government based in Saigon (today’s Ho Chi Minh City). Washington’s involvement in Vietnam escalated with the provision of military assistance first to French forces, followed by Saigon-based President of Vietnam Ngo Dinh Diem’s anti-communist forces after the country’s north-south division. U.S. troops formally deployed in 1964 with the stated purpose of stemming the spread of communism. Years of brutal battles culminated in the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the signing of the Paris Peace Accords [PDF] in 1973; the United States evacuated its personnel in 1975 as North Vietnam invaded the South and reunited the country.     

South Vietnamese scale the walls of the U.S. embassy in Saigon to flee advancing North Vietnamese forces, April 1975.
South Vietnamese scale the walls of the U.S. embassy in Saigon to flee advancing North Vietnamese forces, April 1975. Nik Wheeler/Corbis via Getty Images

U.S. casualties were 58,220 dead, around 2,600 missing, and more than 150,000 wounded [PDF], and there were wrenching domestic divides over the purpose and conduct of the war. For Vietnam the destruction was massive, with an estimated two million civilian deaths and an additional one million military deaths, as well as lasting environmental effects from the use of herbicides, such as Agent Orange, and unexploded ordnance scattered throughout the country. Washington severed diplomatic ties after the war’s end and imposed a full trade embargo.

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Also aggravating relations between Vietnam and a number of nations was its campaign in Cambodia. Skirmishes along the western Vietnamese border with Cambodia expanded into a full-scale conflict in December 1978. Vietnamese troops deposed Cambodian totalitarian leader Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge—its repressive regime was responsible for a genocide that killed nearly two million people—and installed a new government in Phnom Penh that would maintain power for a decade. The Vietnamese invasion triggered a retaliatory attack by China on its northern border in 1979 and widespread international isolation.

From the late 1970s through the mid-1980s, Vietnam’s economy was stretched thin as a result of a large military budget dedicated to activities in Cambodia and shortcomings in its command economy [PDF]. These hardships led to a heavy reliance on the Soviet Union. After China’s economic reforms in the 1970s and as the Soviet Union began to relax state control over its own economy in the 1980s, Vietnam began to explore ways to end its isolation.

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The Path to Normalized Relations

One of the first hurdles to be cleared in restoring U.S.-Vietnam relations was cooperation on returning the remains of U.S. prisoners of war (POW) and missing in action (MIA) personnel. By the end of the 1980s, recovery efforts resumed with processes established for searches across the country by U.S. teams. This progress led to the opening of a field office for the United States Office in MIA Affairs in Hanoi under the George H.W. Bush administration in 1991, the first official postwar U.S. presence in Vietnam. This outpost, combined with a special temporary U.S. Senate committee set up to investigate POW/MIA-related issues, helped build momentum to normalize relations.

U.S. President Bill Clinton greets people on the streets of Ho Chi Minh City on his three-day visit to Vietnam in November 2000.
U.S. President Bill Clinton greets people on the streets of Ho Chi Minh City on his three-day visit to Vietnam in November 2000. Larry Downing/Reuters

Securing a Cambodian peace plan was the second linchpin. Although occupying Vietnamese forces backed a new government in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge still controlled part of the country while in exile in Thailand, and civil conflict was common throughout the 1980s. Peace talks begun in Paris in August 1989 ultimately led to the signing of an accord [PDF] in 1991. This initiated a cease-fire and installed the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, the first UN peacekeeping operation to oversee the administration of a country and to organize and conduct a national election. Vietnam’s withdrawal of occupying forces in Cambodia enabled countries including the United States to repair diplomatic ties with Vietnam. Washington lifted travel restrictions against Vietnam in 1991, the U.S. State Department and the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry opened offices in each other’s capitals in 1993, and in 1994 President Bill Clinton lifted the trade embargo. These incremental steps created a favorable environment for Clinton to normalize relations in 1995.

Economic Linkages

Vietnam’s major economic reforms, launched in 1986 to boost the country’s underperforming economy, signaled an eagerness to restore international ties. The reforms, known as Doi Moi, prioritized building a market economy and creating opportunities for private-sector competition. Previously, the command economy had placed disproportionate importance on heavy industry while sectors such as agriculture struggled.

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A woman crosses in front of a Pepsi billboard in Hanoi a year after the trade embargo was lifted, February, 1995.
A woman crosses in front of a Pepsi billboard in Hanoi a year after the trade embargo was lifted, February, 1995. Claro Cortes IV AS/Reuters

The introduction of a market economy in Vietnam, a country of now more than ninety-five million people, attracted sizeable international investments. After restoring ties, Washington and Hanoi worked for nearly five years to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement that came into force in 2001. The deal lifted many nontariff barriers [PDF] to trade, including quotas, bans, and import restrictions; lowered tariffs from an average of 40 percent to 3 percent on a variety of goods, including agricultural and animal products and electronics; and granted Vietnam conditional most-favored-nation trade status, a critical benchmark for accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). After Vietnam joined the WTO in 2007, the two countries set up a forum to discuss Vietnam’s WTO commitments and additional investment and trade liberalization.

The Barack Obama administration championed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free trade agreement that included a dozen countries in the Asia-Pacific, including Vietnam, as a lynchpin of a U.S. strategic pivot to the region. Analysts said that Vietnam, which had the lowest per capita gross domestic product of all the signatories, was likely to be the greatest beneficiary of the pact, especially by gaining preferential access to the U.S. market. However, President Donald J. Trump, who claimed the deal would undermine the U.S. manufacturing base, withdrew the United States shortly after he took office in 2017.

Human rights advocates say the U.S. reversal dealt a blow to trade unionists, environmentalists, and other activists in Vietnam, who saw the TPP as helping to push a wave of wider reforms. “Pulling out of the TPP has been a big setback,” said Brad Adams, who leads Human Rights Watch’s Asia division, on the ripple effects for Vietnam’s activist communities.

Vietnam and the ten other parties to the TPP moved forward on a trade agreement without the United States, known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Vietnam became the seventh country to ratify the pact, in November 2018. The agreement reduces tariffs in the Asia-Pacific and has provisions to improve labor conditions and boost privatization, but it is too soon to evaluate CPTPP’s consequences for Vietnam. Signatories granted Vietnam a three-year grace period to comply with the agreement’s labor provisions, which call for the introduction of independent unions.

Nevertheless, economists expect trade with the United States to continue thriving. Bilateral trade in goods between has soared since diplomatic normalization, from $451 million in 1995 to more than $60 billion in 2018. The United States is now the top destination for Vietnamese goods, including textiles, electronics, and animal products such as seafood. Top U.S. exports to Vietnam include cotton, computer chips, and soybeans.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade.

A number of challenges loom over the budding commercial relationship. As he has with several other U.S. trading partners, President Trump has taken issue with the U.S. trade imbalance with Vietnam, which climbed to an estimated $39.5 billion in 2018. (This deficit is in goods. U.S. service exports to Vietnam were estimated to be $2 billion in 2015.) Washington has also cited other barriers to trade [PDF] with Vietnam, including inadequate intellectual property protections and food safety regulations, restrictions to the country’s internet access and digital economy, and other general governance issues, including a lack of transparency and accountability in the public and private sectors. 

Growing Security Contacts

Washington and Hanoi have also made significant headway on the security front. Early defense ties were forged through the recovery of U.S. MIA personnel and included cooperation on search and rescue operations, environmental security, and demining; Vietnamese attendance at U.S. Pacific Command conferences and seminars; and high-level military exchanges. In 2016, Washington lifted a decades-long ban on lethal arms sales to Hanoi.

The security relationship has focused on enhancing exchanges between the U.S. and Vietnamese coast guards and the provision of patrol vessels. In 2018, the USS Carl Vinson, a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier, made a historic port call in Vietnam, the first docking of its kind since the end of the war in 1975. The same year, Vietnam participated for the first time in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), maritime military exercises hosted biennially by the United States. (The country was an observer in 2012 and 2016.) 

Vietnam has shown the fewest illusions about the implications of China’s rise.
Joshua Kurlantzick, Council on Foreign Relations

The impetus for much of this activity has been China’s increasingly assertive stance in the region, especially in the South China Sea, where Hanoi and Beijing have competing maritime claims. Tensions between the neighbors reached a climax in 2014 when China deployed an oil rig into disputed waters, a move that prompted widespread anti-China protests and violence across Vietnam. Periodic anti-China protests continue to erupt in Vietnam.

As a result, Vietnam has increasingly viewed its security cooperation with the United States as a check against Chinese assertiveness. “Vietnam has shown the fewest illusions about the implications of China’s rise, and the greatest willingness to employ tough, sophisticated strategies to prevent Chinese dominance of the South China Sea and the region more generally,” writes CFR’s Joshua Kurlantzick.

U.S. President Barack Obama addresses the press with Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang in Hanoi, May, 2016.
U.S. President Barack Obama addresses the press with Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang in Hanoi, May, 2016. Carlos Barria/Reuters

Though defense and security cooperation has come a long way in the more than twenty years since the normalization of relations, obstacles remain. Lingering Vietnamese distrust of U.S. intentions, a strong sense of independence and nationalism, and concerns over provoking Beijing have restrained Hanoi from swiftly expanding security ties with Washington.

Discord on Human Rights

Vietnam’s poor record on human rights is a recurrent source of contention with some members of the U.S. Congress, as well as with other governments and watchdog groups. The country is still governed by a one-party, authoritarian system that suppresses dissent, including from the political opposition, independent religious communities, bloggers, journalists, and human rights advocates and lawyers. Authorities carry out arbitrary arrests and detentions [PDF] and extrajudicial killings; freedoms, such as those of religion, assembly, and speech, are highly restricted; and the judicial system lacks transparency [PDF] and its independence is compromised, according to reports by the U.S. State Department and international rights organizations.

Though the Vietnamese government has convened regular human rights dialogues with the United States and occasionally frees political prisoners, it is consistently rated poorly by international rights monitors. Vietnam ranked 175 out of 180 countries in Reporters Without Borders’ 2018 World Press Freedom Index, only besting China, Syria, Turkmenistan, Eritrea, and North Korea. The advocacy group Freedom House classified Vietnam as “not free,” receiving a 20 out of 100 in its annual report.

A Burgeoning Partnership

U.S.-Vietnam relations are expected to continue on a positive trajectory. While disagreements over the trade imbalance could temporarily stall progress, China’s growing influence in the region will likely push U.S. and Vietnamese strategic interests closer together.

Vietnam holds a key to the regional balance of power.
Alexander Vuving, Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Hanoi was the site of the second U.S.-North Korea summit in February 2019. The Southeast Asian nation served as the host for a variety of reasons, including generally amiable ties with both Pyongyang and Washington and the opportunity to showcase its economic success as an alternative course for North Korea. Hanoi’s role in the summit reinforced shared interests in the U.S.-Vietnam relationship and demonstrated Vietnam’s desire to be a more influential player in regional diplomacy. “Vietnam holds a key to the regional balance of power,” writes Alexander Vuving, an expert on Asia security at a Hawaii-based U.S. Defense Department institute.

Still, Vietnam’s defense policy is based on the “three nos” principle: no military alliances, no foreign troops stationed on Vietnamese soil, and no partnering with a foreign power to combat another. Yet, some analysts have questioned whether Vietnam should revisit its non-alignment policy. While it is elevating ties with the United States, Vietnam is also building relations with the European Union, Japan, and India in a bid to diversify its partnerships and balance its relations with both China and the United States.

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Resources

CFR’s Joshua Kurlantzick says the United States should bolster ties with Vietnam as a model for U.S. relations with other Southeast Asian states as part of its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy.

The Congressional Research Service details the economic and trade components [PDF] of the U.S.-Vietnam relationship.

Carlyle A. Thayer analyzes the shifts in Vietnam’s foreign policy amid increasing competition between the United States and China.

U.S. President Donald J. Trump issued a joint statement with Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc outlining ways to enhance the countries’ partnership in May 2017, and a second statement with Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang in November 2017, during Trump’s visit to Asia.

Alexander Vuving argues for a stronger relationship between Washington and Hanoi to counter Chinese dominance in Asia.

The U.S. State Department describes the Vietnamese government’s restrictions [PDF] on the political rights and civil liberties of its citizens.

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Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Sign up to receive CFR President Mike Froman’s analysis on the most important foreign policy story of the week, delivered to your inbox every Friday afternoon. Subscribe to The World This Week. In the Middle East, Israel and Iran are engaged in what could be the most consequential conflict in the region since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. CFR’s experts continue to cover all aspects of the evolving conflict on CFR.org. While the situation evolves, including the potential for direct U.S. involvement, it is worth touching on another recent development in the region which could have far-reaching consequences: the diffusion of cutting-edge U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) technology to leading Gulf powers. The defining feature of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy is his willingness to question and, in many cases, reject the prevailing consensus on matters ranging from European security to trade. His approach to AI policy is no exception. Less than six months into his second term, Trump is set to fundamentally rewrite the United States’ international AI strategy in ways that could influence the balance of global power for decades to come. In February, at the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit in Paris, Vice President JD Vance delivered a rousing speech at the Grand Palais, and made it clear that the Trump administration planned to abandon the Biden administration’s safety-centric approach to AI governance in favor of a laissez-faire regulatory regime. “The AI future is not going to be won by hand-wringing about safety,” Vance said. “It will be won by building—from reliable power plants to the manufacturing facilities that can produce the chips of the future.” And as Trump’s AI czar David Sacks put it, “Washington wants to control things, the bureaucracy wants to control things. That’s not a winning formula for technology development. We’ve got to let the private sector cook.” The accelerationist thrust of Vance and Sacks’s remarks is manifesting on a global scale. Last month, during Trump’s tour of the Middle East, the United States announced a series of deals to permit the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia to import huge quantities (potentially over one million units) of advanced AI chips to be housed in massive new data centers that will serve U.S. and Gulf AI firms that are training and operating cutting-edge models. These imports were made possible by the Trump administration’s decision to scrap a Biden administration executive order that capped chip exports to geopolitical swing states in the Gulf and beyond, and which represents the most significant proliferation of AI capabilities outside the United States and China to date. The recipe for building and operating cutting-edge AI models has a few key raw ingredients: training data, algorithms (the governing logic of AI models like ChatGPT), advanced chips like Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) or Tensor Processing Units (TPUs)—and massive, power-hungry data centers filled with advanced chips.  Today, the United States maintains a monopoly of only one of these inputs: advanced semiconductors, and more specifically, the design of advanced semiconductors—a field in which U.S. tech giants like Nvidia and AMD, remain far ahead of their global competitors. To weaponize this chokepoint, the first Trump administration and the Biden administration placed a series of ever-stricter export controls on the sale of advanced U.S.-designed AI chips to countries of concern, including China.  The semiconductor export control regime culminated in the final days of the Biden administration with the rollout of the Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, more commonly known as the AI diffusion rule—a comprehensive global framework for limiting the proliferation of advanced semiconductors. The rule sorted the world into three camps. Tier 1 countries, including core U.S. allies such as Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, were exempt from restrictions, whereas tier 3 countries, such as Russia, China, and Iran, were subject to the extremely stringent controls. The core controversy of the diffusion rule stemmed from the tier 2 bucket, which included some 150 countries including India, Mexico, Israel, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Many tier 2 states, particularly Gulf powers with deep economic and military ties to the United States, were furious.  The rule wasn’t just a matter of how many chips could be imported and by whom. It refashioned how the United States could steer the distribution of computing resources, including the regulation and real-time monitoring of their deployment abroad and the terms by which the technologies can be shared with third parties. Proponents of the restrictions pointed to the need to limit geopolitical swing states’ access to leading AI capabilities and to prevent Chinese, Russian, and other adversarial actors from accessing powerful AI chips by contracting cloud service providers in these swing states.  However, critics of the rule, including leading AI model developers and cloud service providers, claimed that the constraints would stifle U.S. innovation and incentivize tier 2 countries to adopt Chinese AI infrastructure. Moreover, critics argued that with domestic capital expenditures on AI development and infrastructure running into the hundreds of billions of dollars in 2025 alone, fresh capital and scale-up opportunities in the Gulf and beyond represented the most viable option for expanding the U.S. AI ecosystem. This hypothesis is about to be tested in real time. In May, the Trump administration killed the diffusion rule, days before it would have been set into motion, in part to facilitate the export of these cutting-edge chips abroad to the Gulf powers. This represents a fundamental pivot for AI policy, but potentially also in the logic of U.S. grand strategy vis-à-vis China. The most recent era of great power competition, the Cold War, was fundamentally bipolar and the United States leaned heavily on the principle of non-proliferation, particularly in the nuclear domain, to limit the possibility of new entrants. We are now playing by a new set of rules where the diffusion of U.S. technology—and an effort to box out Chinese technology—is of paramount importance. Perhaps maintaining and expanding the United States’ global market share in key AI chokepoint technologies will deny China the scale it needs to outcompete the United States—but it also introduces the risk of U.S. chips falling into the wrong hands via transhipment, smuggling, and other means, or being co-opted by authoritarian regimes for malign purposes.  Such risks are not illusory: there is already ample evidence of Chinese firms using shell entities to access leading-edge U.S. chips through cloud service providers in Southeast Asia. And Chinese firms, including Huawei, were important vendors for leading Gulf AI firms, including the UAE’s G-42, until the U.S. government forced the firm to divest its Chinese hardware as a condition for receiving a strategic investment from Microsoft in 2024. In the United States, the ability to build new data centers is severely constrained by complex permitting processes and limited capacity to bring new power to the grid. What the Gulf countries lack in terms of semiconductor prowess and AI talent, they make up for with abundant capital, energy, and accommodating regulations. The Gulf countries are well-positioned for massive AI infrastructure buildouts. The question is simply, using whose technology—American or Chinese—and on what terms? In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it will be American technology for now. The question remains whether the diffusion of the most powerful dual-use technologies of our day will bind foreign users to the United States and what impact it will have on the global balance of power.  We welcome your feedback on this column. Let me know what foreign policy issues you’d like me to address next by replying to [email protected].

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