Weathering the Storm: The Hague Summit and the Future of NATO

Liana Fix is a fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Rebecca Lissner is a senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at CFR.

This Ukraine Policy Brief is part of the Council Special Initiative on Securing Ukraine's Future and the Wachenheim Program on Peace and Security.

Executive Summary

This year’s NATO Summit—to be held from June 24 to June 26 in The Hague—comes at a critical moment for the transatlantic alliance. NATO allies are cautiously optimistic leading up to the summit and hope it will be a businesslike meeting without major disruptions. Most NATO allies are committed to pledging 5 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) to defense spending, as demanded by the Trump administration. Tensions remain, however, over Ukraine’s role in the alliance, the U.S. force posture in Europe, and potential troop withdrawals, as well as the long-term future of the alliance. President Donald Trump’s personal unpredictability notwithstanding, the United States and Europe have to develop a new transatlantic security bargain as the main threat for the United States will be in the Indo-Pacific region. This means transitioning to a European-led NATO, without creating capability or deterrence gaps in the interim. Europe has little choice but to invest in growing its defense capabilities and to muster the political will and domestic support for such efforts.

In the short term:

• European NATO allies should manage the downside risks for the summit in The Hague by drawing up confidential and detailed contingency plans for potential diplomatic ruptures.
• European NATO allies should commit to 5 percent defense spending over the next decade, split into 3.5 percent of direct defense spending and 1.5 percent of indirect defense spending.
• In the final NATO communiqué, European NATO allies should aim for generality and avoid statements on Ukraine and Russia that run counter to previous communiqués.
• NATO allies should consider replacing the 2026 leaders’ summit, scheduled to be held in Turkey, with lower-level gatherings, if relations with the United States remain contentious.

In the long term:

• Europeans should invest in self-defense and build a political case at home for higher defense spending focused on security, economic growth, and innovation, rather than placating Trump.
• European NATO allies should develop formats and venues outside NATO that allow them to discuss the future of European defense without the United States and to prepare for the worst-case scenario of U.S. withdrawal. The E3+1 (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Poland) format could be the nucleus of a future European-led NATO.
• Europeans should conceive of Ukraine as an integral member of Europe’s future security architecture and integrate Ukraine and Ukraine’s defense industry into EU and NATO initiatives.

Introduction: A New Transatlantic Security Bargain

This year’s NATO Summit—to be held from June 24 to June 26 in The Hague—comes at a critical moment for the transatlantic alliance. Since beginning his second term, President Donald Trump has threatened the sovereignty of NATO allies, sought rapprochement with Russia at Ukraine’s expense, and threatened to defend only those allies that meet their defense spending commitments.

Meanwhile, European allies have been taken aback by the Trump administration’s decidedly illiberal turn at home and Vice President JD Vance’s contention at the Munich Security Conference in February that the true danger to Europe is the “threat from within.” Taken together, the five tumultuous months leading up to the NATO Summit have called into question the extent to which the United States’ interests and values remain aligned with its allies.

Nevertheless, NATO allies are cautiously optimistic leading up to the summit. Notwithstanding tense ongoing trade negotiations with the European Union and uncertainty about the future of U.S. support to Ukraine, some of the Trump administration’s recent messaging on NATO has struck a more constructive tone. Speaking alongside NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte at the NATO Foreign Ministerial meeting in May, Secretary of State Marco Rubio predicted “a very successful leaders-level meeting.”

Europe is moving to increase its contributions to NATO defense. The European Commission announced plans to mobilize €150 billion (roughly $170 billion) in loans for defense, and EU members are now allowed to exceed their debt limit for defense spending. NATO allies are also poised to pledge at the summit 5 percent of their GDP to defense spending, as demanded by the Trump administration. Perhaps most remarkably, Germany has emerged as a leader of this effort by adopting a historic constitutional amendment that creates more fiscal flexibility for defense spending.

Despite this progress, underlying frictions remain, and Trump’s personal unpredictability looms large over the summit. NATO’s paramount objective is to project allied unity and strength, but a press conference gone sideways or a negative Truth Social post could undermine the perfectly choreographed displays of comity. Regardless of the narrative that emerges from The Hague, the United States and Europe are clearly moving toward a new transatlantic security bargain—a trend that Trump has accelerated but that will almost certainly outlast his presidency. For this new bargain to succeed in the long term beyond the Trump presidency, it needs to be sustainable and advance the interests of allies on both sides of the Atlantic. 

The Hague Summit: Weathering the Storm

Managing divergent expectations and unexpected contingencies will be crucial for the United States’ NATO allies during the upcoming Hague Summit. European leaders want to avoid the precedent of the 2018 summit in Brussels, where Trump defied diplomatic protocol and publicly berated allies for not spending enough on defense. European allies hope that Trump’s good relations with Rutte can prevent a similar incident. Regardless, European allies should prepare for all contingencies, including Trump refusing to attend, a crisis over Greenland, an escalation in trade talks with the European Union, or the United States cutting off support to Ukraine.

Beyond short-term contingencies, three contentious issues will define this summit: defense spending, NATO’s policy toward Ukraine and Russia, and U.S. force posture in Europe. 

Defense Spending

Trump has called for NATO allies to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense to keep the United States engaged in NATO. In 2024, twenty-three out of thirty-two NATO members reached the 2014 goal of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense. Although most European NATO allies agree that it is in their interest to substantially increase contributions, Trump’s 5 percent goal appeared arbitrary and unrealistic to many allies and thus required creative thinking by NATO officials on how to rationalize the commitment. According to Rutte, the aim is for non-U.S. NATO allies to deliver 70 percent of all NATO capabilities by 2032, up from 56 percent today. To achieve this, his plan is to divide the 5 percent into two parts: 3.5 percent as direct defense spending defined by the same stringent criteria as the Wales Summit 2 percent pledge, and the remaining 1.5 percent as indirect defense spending for resilience (for example, protecting critical infrastructure as well as border and coastal security), cybersecurity, military infrastructure, and dual-use goods, such as drones.

Although this approach has been coordinated with senior U.S. officials, whether it will satisfy Trump remains unclear, as he has repeatedly demanded that the 5 percent consist of “real” defense spending. Also, European publics could find an overall target of 5 percent hard to stomach. According to NATO officials, the 3.5 percent of direct defense spending correlates with the capability targets that NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has defined for NATO’s new operational plans; the increase is thus in Europe’s own interest by allowing the continent to better defend itself against Russia, and not only flatter Trump. Yet even increasing defense spending to just 3.5 percent of GDP would still explode national budgets, especially for countries such as Italy or Spain that do not have the fiscal flexibility of Germany or the threat perceptions of Poland or the Baltic states.  

The U.S. direct financial contribution to NATO’s budget, which is different from the national defense spending pledge, could also shrink from 16 percent of the budget (already negotiated down during Trump’s first term but still the largest share alongside Germany) to almost nothing. A leaked White House memo suggested cutting State Department spending in half, including eliminating entirely the contribution to NATO’s budget. Trump himself suggested the United States should not pay anything for NATO. This would leave European NATO allies with another $3.5 billion shortfall to fill.

NATO’s Policy Toward Ukraine and Russia

The Trump administration has made it clear that it does not see a future for Ukraine in NATO. Since the 2008 Bucharest Summit, however, every NATO summit has reaffirmed Ukraine’s future in NATO in its final communiqué, even if vaguely and without any timeline. (This compromise was made in 2008 to reconcile France and Germany’s opposition to Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership with the George W. Bush administration’s support.) The Trump administration is unlikely to agree to such language, nor does it seem willing to criticize and identify Russia as a threat in official statements. Rather than risk a communiqué that walks back prior statements, the least contentious approach would be to keep the communiqué as short and general as possible, or even discard it entirely. This would mean that, de facto, NATO’s strategic concept from 2022, which clearly defines Russia as a threat and Ukraine’s general future in NATO, remains in place as the main direction of NATO policy even if only as an unrealized promise. Similarly, the release of a new Russia strategy, announced at the Washington Summit in July 2024, should be postponed.

NATO’s European members would also be wise to devise an approach that signals support for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy without risking an escalation between Trump and Zelenskyy at the summit. For example, a parallel meeting with European and Ukrainian leaders could convene shortly before or after the summit. Alternatively, Rutte could plan his own visit to Kyiv around the time of the summit. European NATO allies should also prepare for the United States to propose reviving the defunct NATO-Russia Council, which was fully frozen after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (and already paused for a few years after the annexation of Crimea in 2014), as the United States has reportedly offered during ceasefire negotiations. This move would be hugely divisive, especially with eastern European countries. European allies should find ways to make the revival of full cooperation with Russia conditional on achieving lasting peace in Ukraine. Lastly, they should aim to quietly continue the pledge of together providing $40 billion in annual NATO support for Ukraine.   

U.S. Force Posture in Europe

U.S. NATO Ambassador Matthew Whitaker has reassured European allies that any change in U.S. force posture in Europe will only take place after the summit and will be coordinated with Europeans to avoid any “strategic gaps” in Europe. Although, in principle, such a phased approach is in Europe’s interest, it would take years and massive investments to replace U.S. strategic capabilities in Europe (the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates the bill at $1 trillion). Europeans should also prepare for a more disruptive U.S. approach, including sudden troop withdrawals before or after the summit.

According to U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, a review of the U.S. force posture, which defines U.S. military deployments around the world, is currently underway and will be revealed in the second half of the year. A leaked Pentagon memo discusses withdrawing up to ten thousand troops from Europe. The three most important questions for Europeans are how many troops will be withdrawn (especially because a massive withdrawal could undermine the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence), where they will be withdrawn from (eastern Europe would be at greatest risk without a U.S. troop presence), and what the timeline will be.

Although Republicans in Congress are trying to shape the Pentagon’s posture decisions, Europeans should not rely on lawmakers as their backup (even if they are more sympathetic to Europe than Trump or the Pentagon are). Instead, they should put forward their own roadmap, as suggested by German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, for a managed transition. Rutte has hesitated to preempt the U.S. process, even though a U.S. troop withdrawal would necessitate European replacements and affect NATO’s operational planning and capability targets, as well as planning for a European reassurance force in Ukraine. European members of NATO should therefore start planning for a phased transition as soon as possible.

Beyond The Hague: Shifting the Burden of Defense Capabilities

The expected outcomes of The Hague Summit demonstrate how Europe has already grappled with its new strategic reality and is ready to assume a greater share of the defense spending burden in NATO. Even amid uncertainty about the future of the United States’ commitment to the alliance, Europe has little choice but to invest in growing its defense capabilities. NATO allies hope to show the Trump administration they are serious about burden shifting and staving off U.S. abandonment, but, if abandonment nevertheless occurs, they will be in a stronger position having invested in self-defense. With sustained political will, Europe’s recent steps could end up forming the European pillar of a new transatlantic security bargain that outlasts the Trump administration. 

The initial contours of this approach to burden shifting are already emerging, guided by a vision of a Europe more capable of deterrence and defense against Russia. As the United States turns its attention to China, Europe would assume greater leadership of NATO. NATO would continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but the European members with nuclear weapons, France and the United Kingdom, would explore new models of nuclear deployment and sharing, for example stationing French nuclear-armed aircraft in other European countries such as Germany. The U.S. military would continue contributing to the defense of NATO, especially with its ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) and other unique capabilities, such as airlift, but European allies would assume greater responsibility for conventional deterrence. And U.S. troops would remain deployed on NATO territory, but their number and posture would adjust over time. With those shifts, Europe would become more capable of deterring and, if necessary, defending against Russian aggression.

Realizing this vision will require sustained defense investments that generate real military capabilities while also strengthening Europe’s defense industrial base. Although NATO operational requirements and defense planning assumptions should guide investments, the European Union will need to play a central financing and coordinating role. The European Commission has sketched a blueprint for developing Europe’s military capabilities in its Readiness 2030 white paper. The paper calls for mobilizing €800 billion (roughly $915 billion)—€150 billion through loans and €650 billion through member states’ defense spending that is now exempt from the previous EU debt limit—by the European Commission and envisions member states “closing critical capability gaps and supporting the EU defence industry,” “deepening the single defence market,” and “enhancing European readiness for worst-case scenarios.” The European Union took a concrete step to realize this plan in May, when it approved a €150 billion (roughly $170 billion) Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument, which includes funds for common procurement projects. But much will depend on whether and how member states use their new fiscal flexibility to meet their new NATO spending targets.

As Europe renegotiates its relationship with the United States, the continent will also need strategic leadership. Although no European leader has emerged as a dominant voice on the future of transatlantic relations, new “minilateral” formats are driving action and collaboration among subsets of EU and NATO member states. Most prominent is the “coalition of the willing,” led by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. This informal coalition emerged as a response to Trump’s dramatic early moves on Ukraine and has become a key coordinating forum with a remit that extends beyond Ukraine. Meanwhile, Poland, as the most capable eastern flank ally, is assuming greater importance and leadership, including through the recently concluded Franco-Polish security treaty, which provides mutual security guarantees between the two countries, and the newly energized Weimar Triangle format with France and Germany to make EU foreign policy more effective

Even as the contours of a new transatlantic bargain emerge, significant questions remain. First, will Europe be able to muster the political will to align resources with its newly ambitious rhetoric? European publics could prove unwilling to pay for a large-scale defense build-up, especially if a ceasefire in Ukraine diminishes the salience of the Russian threat. In addition, the enduring specter of pro-Russian right-wing parties, especially in France and Germany, could yield political compromises that undercut spending commitments or even derail them entirely.

Second, how will the United States and Europe manage the shifting of burdens without creating capability or deterrence gaps in the interim? The process of transitioning to a European-led NATO will be slow—five years is an optimistic target—and require a well-orchestrated, gradual, and mutually agreed timeline. Precipitous U.S. troop withdrawals, inordinate delays in European capability generation, or a crisis over Taiwan that requires a sudden repositioning of U.S. forces could all generate windows of opportunity for Russia to exploit.

Third, what role will Ukraine play in the future of European defense? Although Ukraine stands to contribute to European defense with its active defense industrial base and war-tested military, the scale of its contributions will depend on how long it takes to achieve a ceasefire and on the terms of a potential peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Even so, Brussels is already moving to capitalize on the potential for expanded defense cooperation with Kyiv by incorporating coproduction with Ukraine into its Readiness 2030 plans. Ukraine’s EU integration should be used as a pathway to integrate Ukraine not only into the European Single Market but also into the future architecture of European defense.

Finally, European NATO allies should develop formats and venues outside NATO that allow them to discuss the future of European defense without the United States and to prepare for a potential worst-case scenario of U.S. withdrawal. In particular, the E3+1 format—France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Poland—could form the nucleus of a future European-led NATO or an EU-led defense alliance. Coming together in this way would be the most desirable outcome, but there is a possibility that Europeans could instead fall apart into regionalized defense groupings or bilateral reassurance treaties with the United States and other countries. The latter would be a return to a pre-1914 Europe with less security for everyone.

Recommendations

For all of the risks it poses, the June NATO summit also presents an opportunity to strengthen the alliance by taking steps that advance and codify a new transatlantic security bargain. In the short term, European NATO allies have an interest in managing the summit carefully, to avoid a breach with the Trump administration. Over the longer term, NATO needs to take bold but necessary steps to prepare for a European-led alliance in which the United States could play a role of diminishing significance. To achieve that end, the following steps should be undertaken.

Short Term

• European NATO allies, especially the most important countries—France, Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom—should manage the downside risks for the summit in The Hague by drawing up confidential and detailed contingency plans for potential diplomatic ruptures, such as a no-show by the U.S. president, a significant U.S. troop drawdown, a dispute over Greenland, an escalation in trade disputes, a U.S. withdrawal from Russia-Ukraine talks, or a U.S. cutoff of aid to Ukraine.
• European NATO allies should commit to 5 percent defense spending over the next decade, split into 3.5 percent of direct defense spending and 1.5 percent of indirect defense spending. The 1.5 percent should not be defined so broadly that it fails to enhance collective security but instead allows for significant investments into infrastructure and resilience against hybrid threats.
• In the final NATO communiqué, European NATO allies should aim for generality and avoid statements on Ukraine and Russia than run counter to previous communiqués. In the worst case, no communiqué is better than a bad communiqué.
• European NATO allies should put forward their own roadmap for a phased replacement of U.S. forces and capabilities in Europe to prevent a disruptive approach and deterrence gaps.
• If relations between European NATO members and the United States remain contentious, allies should consider replacing the 2026 leaders’ summit, scheduled to be held in Turkey and attended by heads of state and government, with lower-level gatherings, such as a joint foreign and defense ministerial meetings.

Long Term

• Europeans should invest in self-defense and build a political case for defense spending focused on security, economic growth, and innovation, rather than placating Trump. European allies should link their defense investment targets to concrete capabilities, especially to replacing U.S. strategic capabilities such as intelligence and airlift, and invest in Europe’s defense industrial base with the EU bankrolling efforts. They should also turn the 1.5 percent of defense spending dedicated to resilience into a real, purposeful instrument for strengthening critical infrastructure and cybersecurity, for example, that goes beyond already-planned investments.
• European NATO allies should develop formats and venues outside of NATO that allow them to discuss the future of European defense without the United States and to prepare for the worst-case scenario of U.S. withdrawal. The E3+1 format could be the nucleus of a future European-led NATO.
• Europeans should conceive of Ukraine as an integral member of Europe’s future security architecture and integrate Ukraine and its defense industry into efforts to strengthen EU defense capabilities, even if Ukraine is not yet a member state of the union.

Conclusion

Despite cautious optimism, European NATO allies should not overburden the upcoming summit in The Hague with significance; that is, as a test of the United States’ commitment to NATO and of the alliance’s commitment to Ukraine. Instead, the objective should be a short, low-profile, and businesslike meeting. Beyond The Hague, the long-term vision of a new transatlantic security bargain can only be realized if European NATO allies are able to manage the downside risks of an unpredictable second Trump administration. For now, European allies have to survive the summit without a major escalation; only after can they proceed to the long-term planning. At the same time, they need to communicate to their citizens why such major defense investments are needed—in Europe’s own interest, and not solely in Trump’s—despite the budgetary constraints that many of them now face.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.