How to End the Russia-Ukraine War

Thomas Graham is a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

This Ukraine Policy Brief is part of the Council Special Initiative on Securing Ukraine's Future and the Wachenheim Program on Peace and Security.

Executive Summary

With negotiations to end the Russia-Ukraine war at an impasse and Russia refusing to budge from its maximal demands, the Trump administration needs a better strategy to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin that the terms of any negotiated settlement will worsen for Russia the longer he persists on his current course. A strategy that combines resistance to and dialogue with Russia could create the conditions needed to bring Russia to the negotiating table in good faith. But U.S. leadership is critical for success.

To break the deadlock in negotiations, the United States should work with Russia and Ukraine to develop a framework agreement that would lay out a set of principles and parameters for a final settlement. Such an agreement could give both countries sufficient confidence to address their vital interests satisfactorily in future negotiations, so that they could both agree to the immediate ceasefire President Donald Trump seeks and begin talks about the details.

The toughest issues will likely be NATO expansion, security guarantees for Ukraine, territorial disputes, and reconstruction and sanctions relief. A workable compromise could include 

• NATO forswearing further eastward expansion into the former Soviet Union,
• Russia accepting a form of armed neutrality for Ukraine,
• both parties recognizing de facto control of territory with postponement of the ultimate resolution of its disposition to a later date,
• a reconstruction fund for devastated regions to which Russia would make a substantial contribution, and
• sanctions relief tied to concrete steps by Russia to implement the agreed settlement.

Whether Putin would acquiesce to such an arrangement remains to be seen, but the United States loses nothing by trying. Skeptics who doubt that Trump cares enough about Ukraine to stay engaged and adopt the outlined approach should remember that he would not be president today if he shrank away in the face of hardship and abandoned goals central to his own sense of self-worth. Trump’s evident desire to be fêted as a peacemaker worthy of a Nobel Prize suggests that, despite his threats to abandon the effort to end the Russia-Ukraine war, the question is not whether he will remain engaged, but how.

Mounting Frustration With Deadlocked Negotiations

The Trump administration’s effort to bring the Russia-Ukraine war to a quick end has reached an impasse. While Ukraine has buckled under U.S. pressure and agreed to various U.S. proposals for ceasefires and negotiations, Russia has stalled. Putin insists that what he sees as the “root causes” of the conflict (NATO expansion and discrimination against Russian speakers in Ukraine) have to be satisfactorily resolved before he agrees to a ceasefire. Absent that, he will continue Russia’s grinding military campaign. Indeed, many experts suspect that Russia has recently intensified its aerial assaults on Ukraine to prepare for a major ground offensive, which could now be underway.

The Trump administration is clearly frustrated with Russia’s recalcitrance.  Trump has aired his irritation in caustic comments about Putin that he has studiously avoided in the past. “[Putin] has gone absolutely CRAZY,” Trump said in late May, elaborating in a social media post, “What Vladimir Putin doesn’t realize is that if it weren’t for me, lots of really bad things would have already happened to Russia, and I mean REALLY BAD. He is playing with fire.”

What those comments portend for U.S. policy is uncertain. On the one hand, Trump is threatening harsh sanctions to coerce Russia to the negotiating table. On the other, he has threatened to abandon his effort to mediate a ceasefire and peace settlement. After his May 19 phone call with Putin, Trump stated that he would leave the negotiations to Russia and Ukraine. Nevertheless, Trump’s constant focus on Putin’s actions suggests he cannot walk away from the conflict. The damage to his pride and his lingering hopes to draw great benefit from normalizing relations with Russia create a formidable psychological barrier to abandoning the cause.

The Trump administration clearly needs a better strategy—sending the message to Putin that, contrary to his pronouncements, time is not on his side and that, as the Russian ruler likes to taunt Ukraine, the terms of any negotiated settlement will be worse for Russia the longer he persists on his current course. To develop such a strategy, the Trump administration has to understand Putin’s calculus and vulnerabilities, as well as the United States’ points of leverage.

Putin’s Calculus and Vulnerabilities

At the moment, Putin has no incentive to negotiate. His army is making grueling progress on the battlefield against an outgunned and outmanned Ukrainian military. His economy has proved remarkably resilient against Western sanctions, growing by more than 4 percent in each of the past two years, even if projections for this year are half that rate. U.S. support for Ukraine is flagging. Absent congressional appropriation of new funds to support Ukraine, U.S. weapons deliveries will end in the next few months. Europeans are talking a better game, but deep doubts remain about their capacity to replace what the United States has provided, especially timely battlefield intelligence.

The mounting costs of war reinforce Putin’s resolve to press ahead. He has to justify the horrific losses, both human and material, to his elites and the rest of the population. It is a widespread misperception in the West that Putin can simply declare victory without worrying about elite or popular reaction. From the beginning of the invasion, a vocal hard-right nationalist faction has argued that Putin has acted too timidly in Ukraine. Anything less than the total subjugation of Ukraine risks stoking its ire. Putin has undoubtedly not forgotten the mutiny two years ago by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner private military company, over Russia’s incompetent conduct of the war.

At the same time, Putin appears confident that Russians will bear the mounting sacrifice. This year’s May 9 commemoration of the Russian victory over Nazi Germany in World War II underscored Russians’ unity and preternatural endurance in the face of extreme hardship. The losses in the current conflict with Ukraine—close to one million—pale in comparison to the twenty-seven million lost in that global conflagration. Yet it is worth remembering that Russian endurance can flag, especially in losing causes. In the twentieth century alone, Russia abandoned the war with Japan in 1905, accepted a draconian peace imposed by Germany in World War I, and retreated in humiliation from Afghanistan in 1989.

Putin’s rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, Russia’s reserves, both human and material, are not unlimited. He almost certainly understands that. The task facing the Trump administration is to convince Putin and the Russian elites that Ukraine and the West can outlast him, that the mounting costs of the war will outweigh any possible benefit, short-term or long-term, and that the longer the war continues, the worse Russia’s strategic predicament will become, as it is caught between a more united Europe and ever more powerful China.

Ukraine’s ingenious, audacious drone attack on four Russian strategic airbases, one of which is located thousands of miles away from Ukraine, could be of immense help in that regard. To be sure, the assault could stiffen a humiliated Putin’s resolve in the short run—but it makes clear that Ukraine is not about to capitulate, while underscoring Russia’s vulnerabilities. The Kremlin is no doubt worrying about what other surprises Ukraine has in store, especially if Russian forces break through on the front lines or threaten Ukraine. Whether it is true or not, the Kremlin is likely convinced that Kyiv could not have executed such a sophisticated operation without U.S. support. That too will dent Putin’s confidence about the war’s long-term trajectory.

Resistance and Dialogue

The West has the resources to successfully resist Russia’s aggression. The question is whether it has the political will to develop and expend them. European leaders are finally getting serious about paying the price for their own security, but national rivalries and historical memories complicate their task. The effort is unlikely to succeed in the absence of U.S. leadership. That hard truth has far-reaching implications for U.S. strategy.

First, it means that the Trump administration needs to abandon the pretense that it is a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine war. The United States is not an outsider whose only interest lies in seeing the carnage end. Like its European allies and partners, it has a huge stake in the outcome. As Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent have indicated, the U.S. interest lies in preserving a sovereign and independent Ukraine on as wide as possible an expanse of the territory within its internationally recognized borders. Trump needs to state that goal unequivocally, no matter his personal animus toward Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Ukraine’s survival as an independent state is not only good for Ukrainians; it is also a precondition for stabilizing the long frontier between Russia and the West, which currently extends from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, with the segment that crosses Ukraine now being drawn on the battlefield.

To advance that outcome, Washington should adopt the position of the leader of the West, engaged in close consultation with its partners and allies. That will not preclude constructive dialogue with Russia, as relations during the Cold War amply demonstrate, nor does it mean the United States cannot play a critical role in bridging the chasm between Russia’s and Ukraine’s security demands. Indeed, the Kremlin will likely prove more constructive, and find U.S.-proposed compromises more compelling, if the United States is representing a united West. If nothing else, the Kremlin respects power.

Second, the United States should work with its European allies and Ukrainian partners in amassing leverage over Russia. Two steps are essential: continued assistance to Ukraine and resistance to Russia.

Continued assistance to Ukraine. The West should provide Ukraine with the military support it needs to impede, and ideally halt, Russian progress on the front lines. Ukraine’s air defenses, in particular, need to be bolstered to degrade the harm of Russia’s increasingly massive air strikes.

Resistance to Russia. Much of the focus regarding resistance to Russia has been on additional sanctions, even though what were once billed as “crippling” sanctions have so far not led to the desired change in Russian behavior. The idea that additional sanctions, or stricter enforcement, will produce the desired change is magical thinking. It is not just that the Russian economy is resilient; markets are too. Non-Russian businesses, including many Western firms, have been ingenious in the way they have circumvented sanctions.

But there are other sources of leverage. For example, the United States and Europe should accelerate their efforts to expand, modernize, and rationalize their defense-industrial sectors. If there is to be an arms race, the West needs to demonstrate its determination to outpace Russia. Work on the Golden Dome to defend the United States against ballistic missile attacks, and accelerated measures to modernize the U.S. nuclear triad, will highlight the risk to its strategic arsenal that Russia will confront absent serious negotiations.

Those steps, although essential, are not sufficient to change Russian behavior, however. They need to be linked to a broader dialogue with Russia that focuses on more than just the Russia-Ukraine war. The larger issues of European security and strategic stability should also be on the agenda. The stated goal should be the eventual full normalization of relations. That will hold a special appeal to Putin because it will validate Russia as a great power and him as a global leader. It will also help him rebalance relations with China, providing Russia an alternative to excessive reliance on a partner that dominates it economically and outpaces it technologically. The trick for the Trump administration is to impress upon Putin that full normalization will come only with substantial progress in ending the Russia-Ukraine war.

Framework Agreement

The immediate task is to initiate serious negotiations on ending the fighting by breaking the deadlock resulting from Russia’s and Ukraine’s radically different approaches. Ukraine, backed by its European partners, insists on a ceasefire as a precondition for negotiations. Russia demands that the root causes of the conflict be addressed before a ceasefire is put into place. Ukraine seeks ironclad security guarantees from the United States and other major powers, while Russia insists on Ukraine’s neutrality and demilitarization.

In other seemingly intractable conflicts, such as that over Northern Ireland in the 1990s and between Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia in the 2010s, the belligerents found formulating a framework agreement to be a valuable tool in stimulating progress. Such an agreement lays out the principles and parameters of a final settlement. It intends to give the belligerents confidence that the final settlement will address their security and political needs. In the context of Russia and Ukraine, such a document could provide assurances that good-faith negotiations on a settlement would commence immediately after a ceasefire, thus bridging the divide between the two sides’ positions on the cessation of hostilities. To have any weight, the document would have to be signed at a minimum by the United States, in addition to Russia and Ukraine, given the central role the United States has played in pressing for a settlement; however, it should be open to accession by other countries.

To achieve its goal, the framework agreement would have to deal with issues of both substance and process.

Substance

The toughest issues will likely be NATO expansion, security guarantees for Ukraine, the disposition of disputed territory, and reconstruction and sanctions. To bridge the divide between Russia and Ukraine, those issues could be addressed in the following ways. 

•  NATO expansion. As a practical matter, NATO is not going to expand eastward into former Soviet republics. For at least the past decade, NATO members have demonstrated they are not prepared to go to war against Russia to defend Ukraine. Although Ukraine and its backers continue to argue for membership, it is hard to see how NATO would ever achieve the consensus needed to admit the country. The Trump administration has already declared its opposition. Even under a new U.S. administration, Ukrainian membership would struggle to gain the necessary two-thirds Senate majority, given the growing unwillingness of the American public to take on further obligations to defend Europe. If Ukraine will not join NATO, it is even more difficult to envisage the alliance admitting Belarus, a Russian vassal state; Moldova, which has enshrined permanent neutrality in its constitution; and the three Caucasian states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, whose standing as Europeans is questionable. In those circumstances, NATO’s insistence on the principle of an “open door” to any European states seeking membership is a needless obstacle to reducing tension with Russia. NATO should be honest about its intentions and forswear further expansion eastward.
• Security guarantees for Ukraine. If Ukraine remains outside of NATO, it will still need strong security guarantees against renewed Russian aggression. The West can bolster Ukraine’s security by consolidating the bilateral security agreements many countries have already signed and ensuring they are properly financed for at least the next decade. Together, those agreements will help expand and modernize Ukraine’s defense-industrial sector so it can provide an ever-greater share of the weaponry its armed forces will need. They will also enhance military-to-military cooperation and intelligence sharing. The result would be a robust form of armed neutrality for Ukraine. Russia’s concern about the size and capabilities of Ukraine’s armed forces could be dealt with as part of a broader future arrangement by Russia, Ukraine, and NATO allies to reduce tension along the entire Russia-West frontier by regulating military deployments close to that line. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, signed as the Cold War ended, did just that and provides a model of reciprocal restraint that could be adapted to account for current circumstances.
• Territorial issues. The simplest approach would be for Russia and Ukraine to acknowledge each other’s de facto control of disputed territory, without Ukraine formally abandoning a long-term effort to regain its 1991 borders or Russia renouncing its annexation of five Ukrainian provinces, four of which it does not fully control as of June 2025. The final disposition of that territory could be put off for several years as Russia and Ukraine negotiate a formula to determine whether each of the five provinces in dispute would be part of one country or the other. Provincial referenda, a form of local self-determination, could play that role, if properly prepared and monitored.
• Reconstruction and sanctions. Russia insists on full sanctions relief and refuses to pay reparations of any kind. All sides agree, however, that reconstructing the land devastated by the conflict will require considerable effort. A way around Russian objections could be for the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or a similar body to create a reconstruction fund, to which various countries would contribute, with a Russian pledge to make a contribution at a level that approximates the value of its sovereign assets now held in frozen accounts in the West. The United States would lift sanctions gradually in exchange for concrete steps by Russia to end the conflict and deal with its consequences.

Process

The framework agreement would establish a negotiating format to fill in the details of the various issues it identified for resolution. The best arrangement would be to institute a standing conference at a single location to enable continuous negotiations on those issues. Appropriate working groups in various configurations could be created depending on the issue under discussion. The goal would not be to produce a single comprehensive peace treaty but to reach agreements on discrete issues as they ripen for resolution, as was the case during the Cold War. An enduring peace would thus be approached incrementally.

Ideally, the framework agreement would be endorsed in a UN Security Council resolution. That would make it legally binding—something both Kyiv and Moscow would demand—and would encourage other countries to provide material support for the final settlement.

Steps Toward a Framework Agreement and Beyond

Even under the best of circumstances, there will be no easy and quick path to an enduring ceasefire. Negotiating a framework agreement would take considerable time and effort, with U.S. engagement critical to success. But the way ahead is straightforward. To that end, the United States should undertake the following steps:

• adopt the framework approach, including designation of an envoy to lead the effort in what will be a full-time job, demanding active shuttle diplomacy between Kyiv and Moscow and perhaps other capitals;
• consult with Kyiv and Moscow to determine what issues need to be addressed in a framework document and to reach agreement that a ceasefire will take effect immediately upon its signing; 
• negotiate the details of the framework agreement;
• arrange for a trilateral summit—attended by Putin, Trump, and Zelenskyy—to sign the framework agreement and announce the start of a ceasefire;
• work with Russia and Ukraine to form a trilateral ceasefire-monitoring commission;
• coordinate with the appropriate parties to establish working groups that will engage in detailed negotiations of concrete issues consistent with the framework agreement; and
• arrange for the framework agreement to be endorsed in a UN Security Council resolution and opened up for accession by other countries.

Conclusion

Critics will question the logic of the outlined approach and specific elements of the proposed framework agreement. But it is widely accepted—and is the stated position in Washington and other Western capitals—that the war will end in a negotiated settlement. The framework agreement only lays out the contours for the more detailed work needed to conclude a final settlement. Specific compromises can always be interrogated; the challenge to the critics is to offer a package that is more attractive and still feasible. Peacemakers should proceed from the reality that, if the war cannot be won on the battlefield and the settlement imposed by the victor, no side will achieve its maximal goals, but each will have to satisfy its minimal security requirements. The approach above offers a plausible path to that result.

Skeptics will also question whether Putin or Trump will ever buy into such an approach. With regard to Putin, the task is to alter the political context in which he operates, in particular by strengthening and multiplying the United States’ points of leverage. What in the end will bring Putin to the negotiating table is an open question. Whether the proposed approach will succeed can only be known if it is tried. The United States loses nothing by trying—and the steps it would have to take would leave it in a stronger position vis-à-vis Russia, in Europe, and arguably globally, even if Putin should resist.

Doubts abound, of course, about whether Trump will even try. Critics argue that he will abandon the peacemaking effort, as he himself has indeed threatened, because it has turned out to be much harder than he had anticipated. Others insist that Trump does not care enough about Ukraine to fight for its sovereignty and independence and is ready to concede to Putin to reach a deal. There is certainly evidence to back up such claims.

But it is worth remembering that Trump would not be president today if he shrank away in the face of hardship and lightly abandoned goals that are central to his own sense of self-worth. His public musings convey clearly that he wants to be known as a great statesman and peacemaker. He yearns for a Nobel Peace Prize. For better or worse, working with Putin to achieve a peace deal will validate him as a great statesman—and not solely in his own eyes—but only if that deal does not look like capitulation. No matter the depth of his animosity toward Zelenskyy and his disdain for Ukraine, Trump cannot garner his desired reputation without preserving that country’s independence and sovereignty. The mounting pressure on him to levy massive sanctions on Russia—a congressional bill mandating them has eighty-two cosponsors—underscores the domestic blowback he would face if he abandoned Ukraine and appeased Putin. Whether he likes it or not, Trump’s political future, his legacy, is linked to Ukraine and to bringing the war to an honorable end. No matter what he says, the question is not whether he should stay engaged, but how.    

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.