Is ASEAN Leaving the U.S. Behind on Trade?
from Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies
from Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies

Is ASEAN Leaving the U.S. Behind on Trade?

A worker is seen at the Yangshan Deep Water Port in Shanghai, China on September 24, 2016.
A worker is seen at the Yangshan Deep Water Port in Shanghai, China on September 24, 2016. Aly Song/Reuters

The Southeast Asia trade group, China, Japan, and South Korea said they will work closely together due to “escalating trade protectionism.” Three CFR fellows explain how their U.S. relationship will pose a challenge.

May 6, 2025 4:13 pm (EST)

A worker is seen at the Yangshan Deep Water Port in Shanghai, China on September 24, 2016.
A worker is seen at the Yangshan Deep Water Port in Shanghai, China on September 24, 2016. Aly Song/Reuters
Article
Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

China, Japan, South Korea—and the ten states that make up the regional organization called the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—issued a statement on Monday that raised the eyebrows of some economists and trade experts. The countries expressed concern about “escalating trade protectionism” and agreed to work together to “reinforce long-term economic resilience” in their region. 

More From Our Experts

Though they made no mention of U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs and trade wars, the countries’ statement indirectly indicts Trump and seems to suggest a shared desire to work more closely together on various economic issues. This appears to be part of an implicit effort to create distance from the increasing volatility of the United States’ trade approach and its effect on supply chains and U.S.equities and bonds. 

More on:

Asia

ASEAN

Trade

Trade War

Trump

We asked three CFR senior fellows—Rebecca Patterson, Brad W. Setser, and Joshua Kurlantzick— to comment on the significance of the statement and whether it truly indicates a shift in global trade relationships.

Does the statement mark a departure for China, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN countries, or is it consistent with previous statements?

Patterson: This statement seems more of an incremental update than any sort of notable departure. But it is a good reminder for those of us not living in the depths of global trade every day that this group of countries is part of the largest free-trade agreement in the world: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which leaders explicitly reaffirmed their support for at this meeting.

The United States is not a member of this bloc. While the United States is too big for other countries to ignore, the ongoing trade war has the ability to push other countries closer together, especially where policy infrastructure like this already exists.

More From Our Experts
The United States would prefer countries not to trade as much with China. This statement goes in the other direction.

Kurlantzick: But overall, this statement—as with a lot of things ASEAN does—is lip service without follow-through. And ASEAN struggles badly to follow through on any major initiatives. Even RCEP, though initially driven by ASEAN, was mostly commandeered by China to completion. 

ASEAN operates by consensus, and so any one state in the group can block its actions. So it is possible, for instance, if this statement were going to lead to real action, that the Philippines—the most pro-U.S. country in ASEAN—would block any actual action. Such blocking has been done by various states over the years for different reasons, but it holds ASEAN back in effectiveness.

More on:

Asia

ASEAN

Trade

Trade War

Trump

Setser: For all their talk about regional integration, I rather doubt the ASEAN countries will lose interest in exploiting the opportunities to increase trade with the United States created by the large differential between the tariff on direct bilateral U.S.-China trade and the tariff on indirect trade that relies heavily on Chinese parts that assembled in the ASEAN countries.

The steps Europeans are taking to expand fiscal policy and increase their own demand are more significant—and that is still what is lacking out of Asia.

What points from the statement are potentially significant?

Patterson: I think it’s noteworthy that the countries called for “enhanced regional unity and cooperation as we endeavor to weather the heightened uncertainty.” The United States would prefer countries not to trade as much with China. This statement goes in the other direction.

Generating real resilience in the face of the Trump shock will take more than another endorsement of the virtue of open trade.

Kurlantzick: I agree, though I think creating a group of countries that will band together and isolate China was always going to be an incredibly difficult sell in Asia. China dominates trade in the region and is the largest trading partner of nearly every country in East Asia. The White House also just basically ended the U.S. Agency for International Development, which spent significant sums in Southeast and South Asia.

Setser: I am the resident curmudgeon here. A group of countries that all run current account surpluses can talk all they want about building their collective resilience, but together they run a massive surplus against the world and adding in more surplus countries doesn’t solve the basic problem that there isn’t an East Asian deficit or demand engine.

Generating real resilience in the face of the Trump shock will take more than another endorsement of the virtue of open trade. These are economies that haven’t been able to generate enough demand for their own output for some time. That will require them to think a bit outside the trade box.

Kurlantzick: Some, such as China, Japan, and Singapore, have begun to do so.

Does the statement suggest that major U.S. trading partners are planning to make alternative arrangements in trade or finance that exclude the United States?

Setser: They are certainly trying. But the Asian countries in particular face real limits on what they can achieve with regional integration alone. The ASEAN countries run a surplus with the world. China runs a huge surplus with the world. Korea’s surplus more than offsets Japan’s small deficit. Until this changes, these countries need to find an extra-regional outlet for their massive combined surplus. 

Kurlantzick: If they are rethinking their relationship with the United States, these countries need to look more to Europe, Latin America, and their own populations. Chinese leaders realize this now, but they should have emphasized this years (or decades) ago, when the economy was actually booming. Instead, people saved, and consumer spending is still vastly lagging what it should be to balance China’s economy more. 

Now, growth is weak, unemployment is high, and young people—who are avid consumers in many countries—are disenchanted. It doesn’t help that Chinese President Xi Jinping spent years squeezing the best-run and biggest companies in China selling consumer goods. 

They make no mention of Donald Trump or the United States’ proposed or enacted tariffs. Is that part of a larger strategy and who could they be trying to reach with this statement?

Patterson: Speaking in generalities rather than specific names could be an attempt to avoid confrontation, but names aren’t needed right now. In terms of audience, I would guess these leaders want to show they are being active to their domestic audiences as much as they want to remind the United States that they have each other to lean on. 

Kurlantzick: Everyone who reads that statement knows who they are talking about, but it’s particularly ASEAN’s style to criticize subtly and not angrily.

Setser: I second the point made by Josh.

Creative Commons
Creative Commons: Some rights reserved.
Close
This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) License.
View License Detail
Close

Top Stories on CFR

Ukraine

European leaders should avoid clashing with Trump at the NATO Summit in The Hague. In the coming months and years, they should focus on increasing defense spending, further integrating Ukraine into the regional security architecture, and developing a European-led future for the alliance.

Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Sign up to receive CFR President Mike Froman’s analysis on the most important foreign policy story of the week, delivered to your inbox every Friday afternoon. Subscribe to The World This Week. In the Middle East, Israel and Iran are engaged in what could be the most consequential conflict in the region since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. CFR’s experts continue to cover all aspects of the evolving conflict on CFR.org. While the situation evolves, including the potential for direct U.S. involvement, it is worth touching on another recent development in the region which could have far-reaching consequences: the diffusion of cutting-edge U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) technology to leading Gulf powers. The defining feature of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy is his willingness to question and, in many cases, reject the prevailing consensus on matters ranging from European security to trade. His approach to AI policy is no exception. Less than six months into his second term, Trump is set to fundamentally rewrite the United States’ international AI strategy in ways that could influence the balance of global power for decades to come. In February, at the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit in Paris, Vice President JD Vance delivered a rousing speech at the Grand Palais, and made it clear that the Trump administration planned to abandon the Biden administration’s safety-centric approach to AI governance in favor of a laissez-faire regulatory regime. “The AI future is not going to be won by hand-wringing about safety,” Vance said. “It will be won by building—from reliable power plants to the manufacturing facilities that can produce the chips of the future.” And as Trump’s AI czar David Sacks put it, “Washington wants to control things, the bureaucracy wants to control things. That’s not a winning formula for technology development. We’ve got to let the private sector cook.” The accelerationist thrust of Vance and Sacks’s remarks is manifesting on a global scale. Last month, during Trump’s tour of the Middle East, the United States announced a series of deals to permit the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia to import huge quantities (potentially over one million units) of advanced AI chips to be housed in massive new data centers that will serve U.S. and Gulf AI firms that are training and operating cutting-edge models. These imports were made possible by the Trump administration’s decision to scrap a Biden administration executive order that capped chip exports to geopolitical swing states in the Gulf and beyond, and which represents the most significant proliferation of AI capabilities outside the United States and China to date. The recipe for building and operating cutting-edge AI models has a few key raw ingredients: training data, algorithms (the governing logic of AI models like ChatGPT), advanced chips like Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) or Tensor Processing Units (TPUs)—and massive, power-hungry data centers filled with advanced chips.  Today, the United States maintains a monopoly of only one of these inputs: advanced semiconductors, and more specifically, the design of advanced semiconductors—a field in which U.S. tech giants like Nvidia and AMD, remain far ahead of their global competitors. To weaponize this chokepoint, the first Trump administration and the Biden administration placed a series of ever-stricter export controls on the sale of advanced U.S.-designed AI chips to countries of concern, including China.  The semiconductor export control regime culminated in the final days of the Biden administration with the rollout of the Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, more commonly known as the AI diffusion rule—a comprehensive global framework for limiting the proliferation of advanced semiconductors. The rule sorted the world into three camps. Tier 1 countries, including core U.S. allies such as Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, were exempt from restrictions, whereas tier 3 countries, such as Russia, China, and Iran, were subject to the extremely stringent controls. The core controversy of the diffusion rule stemmed from the tier 2 bucket, which included some 150 countries including India, Mexico, Israel, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Many tier 2 states, particularly Gulf powers with deep economic and military ties to the United States, were furious.  The rule wasn’t just a matter of how many chips could be imported and by whom. It refashioned how the United States could steer the distribution of computing resources, including the regulation and real-time monitoring of their deployment abroad and the terms by which the technologies can be shared with third parties. Proponents of the restrictions pointed to the need to limit geopolitical swing states’ access to leading AI capabilities and to prevent Chinese, Russian, and other adversarial actors from accessing powerful AI chips by contracting cloud service providers in these swing states.  However, critics of the rule, including leading AI model developers and cloud service providers, claimed that the constraints would stifle U.S. innovation and incentivize tier 2 countries to adopt Chinese AI infrastructure. Moreover, critics argued that with domestic capital expenditures on AI development and infrastructure running into the hundreds of billions of dollars in 2025 alone, fresh capital and scale-up opportunities in the Gulf and beyond represented the most viable option for expanding the U.S. AI ecosystem. This hypothesis is about to be tested in real time. In May, the Trump administration killed the diffusion rule, days before it would have been set into motion, in part to facilitate the export of these cutting-edge chips abroad to the Gulf powers. This represents a fundamental pivot for AI policy, but potentially also in the logic of U.S. grand strategy vis-à-vis China. The most recent era of great power competition, the Cold War, was fundamentally bipolar and the United States leaned heavily on the principle of non-proliferation, particularly in the nuclear domain, to limit the possibility of new entrants. We are now playing by a new set of rules where the diffusion of U.S. technology—and an effort to box out Chinese technology—is of paramount importance. Perhaps maintaining and expanding the United States’ global market share in key AI chokepoint technologies will deny China the scale it needs to outcompete the United States—but it also introduces the risk of U.S. chips falling into the wrong hands via transhipment, smuggling, and other means, or being co-opted by authoritarian regimes for malign purposes.  Such risks are not illusory: there is already ample evidence of Chinese firms using shell entities to access leading-edge U.S. chips through cloud service providers in Southeast Asia. And Chinese firms, including Huawei, were important vendors for leading Gulf AI firms, including the UAE’s G-42, until the U.S. government forced the firm to divest its Chinese hardware as a condition for receiving a strategic investment from Microsoft in 2024. In the United States, the ability to build new data centers is severely constrained by complex permitting processes and limited capacity to bring new power to the grid. What the Gulf countries lack in terms of semiconductor prowess and AI talent, they make up for with abundant capital, energy, and accommodating regulations. The Gulf countries are well-positioned for massive AI infrastructure buildouts. The question is simply, using whose technology—American or Chinese—and on what terms? In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it will be American technology for now. The question remains whether the diffusion of the most powerful dual-use technologies of our day will bind foreign users to the United States and what impact it will have on the global balance of power.  We welcome your feedback on this column. Let me know what foreign policy issues you’d like me to address next by replying to [email protected].

RealEcon

The Global Fragility Act (GFA) serves as a blueprint for smart U.S. funding to prevent and end conflict, and bipartisan congressional leaders advocate reauthorization of the 2019 law.