The Armed Forces of the Future

The Armed Forces of the Future

U.S. President Donald Trump makes an announcement regarding the Golden Dome missile defense shield next to U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., May 20, 2025.
U.S. President Donald Trump makes an announcement regarding the Golden Dome missile defense shield next to U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., May 20, 2025. Kevin Lamarque/Reuters

The future of defense strategy requires restructuring forces for modern threats, focusing deployments on critical regions, accelerating tech integration, reforming procurement and budgets, revitalizing the industrial base, and investing in top talent.  

May 23, 2025 3:51 pm (EST)

U.S. President Donald Trump makes an announcement regarding the Golden Dome missile defense shield next to U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., May 20, 2025.
U.S. President Donald Trump makes an announcement regarding the Golden Dome missile defense shield next to U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., May 20, 2025. Kevin Lamarque/Reuters
Article
Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

Sign up to receive CFR President Mike Froman’s analysis on the most important foreign policy story of the week, delivered to your inbox every Friday afternoon. Subscribe to The World This Week.

More From Our Experts

On Monday, I convened CFR’s version of a “tank” meeting in Washington D.C. No, not a reference to Shark Tank, but to the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s secure conference room located deep in the Pentagon. Present were chiefs of all the U.S. services: General Randy George, chief of staff of the Army; General Eric Smith, commandant of the Marine Corps; Admiral James Kilby, acting chief of naval operations of the U.S. Navy; General David W. Allvin, chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force; General B. Chance Saltzman, chief of space operations of the U.S. Space Force; and Admiral Kevin Lunday, acting commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard.

More on:

Foreign Policy

Defense and Security

It’s rare to have the service chiefs together in one room—above ground in an unclassified, on-the-record setting no less—to discuss the future of U.S. military strategy and leadership.

Across all of the services, a clear constant was a desire for radical change in the ways the United States fights, structures its forces, and manages its procurement. Projects to reform or transform the military are nothing new. But a confluence of events—chiefly among them, the rise of China as the “pacing threat,” the role of the private sector in driving innovative technologies with military implications, and an emerging consensus across the executive branch, Congress, and the defense sector that the United States can’t financially or strategically afford to keep doing things the way they have always been done—creates a sense that this time might be different.

When it comes to reform and transformation, several cross-cutting themes emerged:

More From Our Experts

First, there is a need to restructure forces for new challenges they are likely to face. Take the Marine Corps. Having been focused for decades on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, they are halfway through a ten-year process of redesigning their forces to emphasize amphibious capabilities well-suited for operations against near-peer adversaries in littoral waters. That’s code for China.

Second, there is the deployment of forces to priority theaters. This raises the perennial issue of whether the United States can or should focus less on Europe or the Middle East and rebalance more to the Indo-Pacific. Two-thirds of the Marine Corps’ active-duty combat forces are now operating in the Indo-Pacific. But long-term force posture priorities don’t always align neatly with current crises. For example, a Navy carrier strike group led by the USS Carl Vinson was redeployed from a mission in the Indo-Pacific to support Central Command’s campaign against the Houthis and defense of Israel. 

More on:

Foreign Policy

Defense and Security

Third, there is a fundamentally new dynamic between the military and the private sector, with startups, defense technology companies and emerging defense contractors driving the development of new capabilities. Traditionally, the Pentagon would issue detailed requirements, and defense contractors would then build to those specifications. A major platform, like a new fighter or an aircraft carrier, could take six to ten years to build from initial design to deployment, by which time the actual needs of the mission might well have evolved. Now, the pace of technological change is accelerating, much of the cutting edge is being developed by the private sector—think drones and AI—and the services are trying to figure out how best to integrate it quickly into their warfighting capabilities. There is a lot of exuberance about the potential for drones, operating underwater, on the surface and in the air, but the key might well be how to combine autonomous platforms and more traditional weapons, just as the Air Force plans to do with the B-21 bomber, the F-47 fighter, and the uncrewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft. It’s also why major new systems, such as President Trump’s proposed Golden Dome missile defense shield, which the Space Force will play a major role in fielding, will rely on open, interoperable architectures.

The Army has been working to free up and deploy resources to procure emerging technologies quickly into the field, where they can be tested, refined and integrated into operations. General George pointed to a drone-equipped mobile brigade combat team in Europe that proved to be 300 percent more lethal than other units thanks to their new kit and tactics. These pilot projects, however, are just that. To move the needle, these technologies need to be scaled—not to one brigade or another but across the services in entirety.

That leads to a fourth theme: a fundamental need for change in the budget and funding process. There is great demand for the flexibility to move funding from one system to another, multi-year budgeting rather than repeated, short-term continuing resolutions, and the capacity to actually cancel programs that are obsolete and less relevant to the mission at hand. A striking feature of the Army’s current push is a willingness to drop dated programs. Some of the service’s iconic legacy systems, such as the Humvee and AH-64D Apache attack helicopter, are on the chopping block. But the broader issue of flexibility in procurement for the services and reliable funding is not an issue that any one service or even the executive branch can solve on its own. It very much implicates Congress, its role in providing oversight, and the political dynamics around members’ support for products that are built and employ people in their districts.

A fifth major theme is the status of the U.S. defense industrial base, which has shrunk significantly since the end of the Cold War. The capacity shortfall is impacting all of the services, especially in the maritime domain. For example, the Coast Guard fields only one heavy icebreaker at the moment, the fifty-year-old Polar Star. Arctic security issues are getting increased attention (e.g., Trump’s expressed interest in Greenland, China declaring itself a “near-Arctic state”), requiring increased capacity. Today, China’s total shipbuilding capacity is 200 times larger than the shipbuilding capacity available to the U.S. military. President Biden highlighted this shipbuilding gap, and President Trump recently issued an executive order to address a raft of bureaucratic reforms and emergency funding to streamline shipbuilding procurement and design processes. The U.S. could also benefit from partnering and securing foreign investment from our allies, such as Japan and South Korea, who possess substantial latent shipbuilding capacity and world-class capabilities. Yet, these changes could take years to bear fruit given the structural constraints of the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base, including the lack of production infrastructure and skilled labor.

Finally, one thing all of the chiefs agreed on was the importance of doing everything possible to recruit, retain, promote, motivate and empower the very best men and women in the armed forces. They are ultimately our most important asset. That goes to everything, including their training, quality of life, and the pathways they see for advancement. There is some good news on this front. After years of chronic recruiting shortfalls, intake numbers across all of the core services have surged over the past several quarters—and Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill includes a one-time $8.5 billion funding increase for barracks maintenance, military health care, and other service member quality-of-life initiatives.

One question on my mind is the longer-term challenge that could emerge from the administration’s decision to fire senior military leaders earlier this year. Abrupt personnel firings—including of the only two female service chiefs and only the second African American to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—risk damaging the interest and morale of the next generation of men and women the United States needs for its 21st century military.

We welcome your feedback on this column. Let me know what foreign policy issues you’d like me to address next by replying to [email protected].

Creative Commons
Creative Commons: Some rights reserved.
Close
This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) License.
View License Detail
Close

Top Stories on CFR

Ukraine

European leaders should avoid clashing with Trump at the NATO Summit in The Hague. In the coming months and years, they should focus on increasing defense spending, further integrating Ukraine into the regional security architecture, and developing a European-led future for the alliance.

Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Sign up to receive CFR President Mike Froman’s analysis on the most important foreign policy story of the week, delivered to your inbox every Friday afternoon. Subscribe to The World This Week. In the Middle East, Israel and Iran are engaged in what could be the most consequential conflict in the region since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. CFR’s experts continue to cover all aspects of the evolving conflict on CFR.org. While the situation evolves, including the potential for direct U.S. involvement, it is worth touching on another recent development in the region which could have far-reaching consequences: the diffusion of cutting-edge U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) technology to leading Gulf powers. The defining feature of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy is his willingness to question and, in many cases, reject the prevailing consensus on matters ranging from European security to trade. His approach to AI policy is no exception. Less than six months into his second term, Trump is set to fundamentally rewrite the United States’ international AI strategy in ways that could influence the balance of global power for decades to come. In February, at the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit in Paris, Vice President JD Vance delivered a rousing speech at the Grand Palais, and made it clear that the Trump administration planned to abandon the Biden administration’s safety-centric approach to AI governance in favor of a laissez-faire regulatory regime. “The AI future is not going to be won by hand-wringing about safety,” Vance said. “It will be won by building—from reliable power plants to the manufacturing facilities that can produce the chips of the future.” And as Trump’s AI czar David Sacks put it, “Washington wants to control things, the bureaucracy wants to control things. That’s not a winning formula for technology development. We’ve got to let the private sector cook.” The accelerationist thrust of Vance and Sacks’s remarks is manifesting on a global scale. Last month, during Trump’s tour of the Middle East, the United States announced a series of deals to permit the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia to import huge quantities (potentially over one million units) of advanced AI chips to be housed in massive new data centers that will serve U.S. and Gulf AI firms that are training and operating cutting-edge models. These imports were made possible by the Trump administration’s decision to scrap a Biden administration executive order that capped chip exports to geopolitical swing states in the Gulf and beyond, and which represents the most significant proliferation of AI capabilities outside the United States and China to date. The recipe for building and operating cutting-edge AI models has a few key raw ingredients: training data, algorithms (the governing logic of AI models like ChatGPT), advanced chips like Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) or Tensor Processing Units (TPUs)—and massive, power-hungry data centers filled with advanced chips.  Today, the United States maintains a monopoly of only one of these inputs: advanced semiconductors, and more specifically, the design of advanced semiconductors—a field in which U.S. tech giants like Nvidia and AMD, remain far ahead of their global competitors. To weaponize this chokepoint, the first Trump administration and the Biden administration placed a series of ever-stricter export controls on the sale of advanced U.S.-designed AI chips to countries of concern, including China.  The semiconductor export control regime culminated in the final days of the Biden administration with the rollout of the Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, more commonly known as the AI diffusion rule—a comprehensive global framework for limiting the proliferation of advanced semiconductors. The rule sorted the world into three camps. Tier 1 countries, including core U.S. allies such as Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, were exempt from restrictions, whereas tier 3 countries, such as Russia, China, and Iran, were subject to the extremely stringent controls. The core controversy of the diffusion rule stemmed from the tier 2 bucket, which included some 150 countries including India, Mexico, Israel, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Many tier 2 states, particularly Gulf powers with deep economic and military ties to the United States, were furious.  The rule wasn’t just a matter of how many chips could be imported and by whom. It refashioned how the United States could steer the distribution of computing resources, including the regulation and real-time monitoring of their deployment abroad and the terms by which the technologies can be shared with third parties. Proponents of the restrictions pointed to the need to limit geopolitical swing states’ access to leading AI capabilities and to prevent Chinese, Russian, and other adversarial actors from accessing powerful AI chips by contracting cloud service providers in these swing states.  However, critics of the rule, including leading AI model developers and cloud service providers, claimed that the constraints would stifle U.S. innovation and incentivize tier 2 countries to adopt Chinese AI infrastructure. Moreover, critics argued that with domestic capital expenditures on AI development and infrastructure running into the hundreds of billions of dollars in 2025 alone, fresh capital and scale-up opportunities in the Gulf and beyond represented the most viable option for expanding the U.S. AI ecosystem. This hypothesis is about to be tested in real time. In May, the Trump administration killed the diffusion rule, days before it would have been set into motion, in part to facilitate the export of these cutting-edge chips abroad to the Gulf powers. This represents a fundamental pivot for AI policy, but potentially also in the logic of U.S. grand strategy vis-à-vis China. The most recent era of great power competition, the Cold War, was fundamentally bipolar and the United States leaned heavily on the principle of non-proliferation, particularly in the nuclear domain, to limit the possibility of new entrants. We are now playing by a new set of rules where the diffusion of U.S. technology—and an effort to box out Chinese technology—is of paramount importance. Perhaps maintaining and expanding the United States’ global market share in key AI chokepoint technologies will deny China the scale it needs to outcompete the United States—but it also introduces the risk of U.S. chips falling into the wrong hands via transhipment, smuggling, and other means, or being co-opted by authoritarian regimes for malign purposes.  Such risks are not illusory: there is already ample evidence of Chinese firms using shell entities to access leading-edge U.S. chips through cloud service providers in Southeast Asia. And Chinese firms, including Huawei, were important vendors for leading Gulf AI firms, including the UAE’s G-42, until the U.S. government forced the firm to divest its Chinese hardware as a condition for receiving a strategic investment from Microsoft in 2024. In the United States, the ability to build new data centers is severely constrained by complex permitting processes and limited capacity to bring new power to the grid. What the Gulf countries lack in terms of semiconductor prowess and AI talent, they make up for with abundant capital, energy, and accommodating regulations. The Gulf countries are well-positioned for massive AI infrastructure buildouts. The question is simply, using whose technology—American or Chinese—and on what terms? In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it will be American technology for now. The question remains whether the diffusion of the most powerful dual-use technologies of our day will bind foreign users to the United States and what impact it will have on the global balance of power.  We welcome your feedback on this column. Let me know what foreign policy issues you’d like me to address next by replying to [email protected].

RealEcon

The Global Fragility Act (GFA) serves as a blueprint for smart U.S. funding to prevent and end conflict, and bipartisan congressional leaders advocate reauthorization of the 2019 law.