Renewed Tensions Between India and Pakistan

Panelists discuss recent developments in the conflict between India and Pakistan, analyzing the drivers of escalation, the domestic political dynamics shaping bilateral relations, and the potential consequences for regional security, great power competition, and U.S. foreign policy in South Asia.

TRANSCRIPT

AYRES: My name is Alyssa Ayres and I’m dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. I’m also an adjunct senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at CFR. And I’ll be presiding over today’s discussion.

We’ve got two incredible panelists who will be sharing their expertise with us on this subject.

First, Ambassador Ken Juster, who is a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Of course, Ambassador Juster served as the U.S. ambassador to India from 2017 to 2021. I would also note that he has served as the deputy national security advisor for international economics. He’s been an undersecretary of commerce and a former counselor of the State Department. So tremendous expertise at the highest levels of the U.S. government.

We are also joined by Dr. Dan Markey, who is senior fellow for China and South Asia at the Stimson Center. He has been a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, where I had the pleasure of working closely with him. And I want to note that he’s the author of two excellent books on the region. The first titled, No Exit From Pakistan, about the challenges of the U.S. relationship with Pakistan. And his second, most recent book, on China’s Western Horizons, about China’s relations with the countries to its west, which includes, of course, South Asia. So we’ve got two panelists with deep expertise to talk with us today.

So we’re here to talk about renewed tensions between India and Pakistan. I think everybody joining our conversation today is aware on April 22 there was a horrific terrorist attack on tourists in Pahalgam in India. Killed twenty-six people from regions across India. Many parts of the country felt this attack as a result. Initially a group named The Resistance Front claimed responsibility for it, though that attribution seems to be less clear now. The most immediate response after this, India then said it was going to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty, a kind of non-military measure to signal displeasure. Some time elapsed, a couple weeks. And then on May 7 India announced strikes across nine sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

And that included, as I think our panelists will talk about, some locations deep inside Pakistan. So not just areas that would be limited to Pakistan-administered Kashmir. India described these strikes as controlled, precise, measured, and non-escalatory. I think if we were convening this panel one week ago we would have been talking about fears of escalation, given what quickly unfolded. So a week after the events, let’s take a step back and get some deeper analysis on what we think took place. I’d like to ask both Ambassador Juster and Dr. Markey to speak a little bit about what they see as leading to the pattern that we saw last week, what is the domestic political landscape in each country that shaped their leaders’ choices—why don’t we start with that? Ambassador Juster, over to you.

JUSTER: OK. Well, thank you very much, Alyssa. And it’s a pleasure to be here with you and Dan. Let me give my perspective of how Prime Minister Modi has dealt with terrorist incidents since his time in power. Looking at the incident that occurred in 2016 in a town called Uri, right over the line of control in India-administered Kashmir. And then in 2019, when I was ambassador, there was a terrorist incident in Pulwama killing forty Indian troops. And the response that was made by the prime minister then, and the domestic political situation, and then compare it to this to see what has changed.

In 2016, the Indians responded to this attack on an army base in the town of Uri with what they called a “surgical attack” in Pakistani-administered Kashmir. In 2019, they expanded that and actually, for the first time, responded by going into Pakistan proper with jet fighters—or, fighter jets to bomb Balakot. That led to a bit of a dogfight. The Pakistanis came back with jets. They shot down an Indian plane that was in Pakistan. They captured a pilot. But the situation, when the pilot was returned, was deescalated. I can speak to the role that we played in trying to prevent a nuclear exchange, because both parties saw nuclear weapons being moved by the other and was very concerned at that time.

And I also would say, in 2019 it was—the incident was in February, and there was an election at the national level in May. And so Prime Minister Modi, who many thought was in a weaker position than expected in 2019 because of economic problems, actually very much strengthened his image as a strong leader. And people felt that the response to Pulwama had a large impact on the election, and the overwhelming number of seats that the BJP won in putting the prime minister back for a second term.

This latest incident, the response by the Indians—and, again, they take probably ten to fourteen days to make the response—was even further than what happened in Balakot, where they went, as you said, after nine sites, the whole terrorist infrastructure not just a particular camp. And it was not just in Pakistan proper, but also in Punjab, which is really the heart of Pakistan. And the level of technology has far accelerated so that the missiles that India delivered were done in a standoff position where they never had planes that had to fly over the border. The Pakistanis responded with Chinese planes and missiles that they claim shot down some Indian planes and destroyed a S-400 Russian air defense system that India had.

And the situation quickly escalated because of the use of drones and missiles to where military bases were being attacked. And that’s when the United States seemed to get more involved because, initially, the vice president has said that this is not a matter that the U.S. would be involved in. And so there are differences in how the scope of the response by India, the escalating nature—and it’s qualitatively different because of where they went to attack—and the use of technology and even Chinese weaponry that had not previously been used, and how quickly things could escalate and have a life of their own.

And it’s led Prime Minister Modi to enunciate his own new doctrine, because for him a muscular response by India is very important, that had really three elements. One, that they would have decisive retaliation to any terrorist action. Two, they would have zero tolerance for any effort at nuclear blackmail. And the third one was that they would hold the sponsors for terrorism equally liable as the terrorists themselves. This is meant to try to deter any further incidents, but it also is an effort to really show a strong India and a strong prime minister. He does not have the same election imperatives that he did in 2019, but this is really part of his persona overall. So I can expand on any of that, but that’s a broader perspective that I see happening here.

AYRES: Thanks. So we’ll definitely want to come back, I think, and talk a little bit more about some of the defense technology issues, because that has been, I think, a big point of difference with the past. But, Dan, would love to hear your thinking about the domestic landscape in Pakistan and what has created the context for this most recent conflagration.

MARKEY: Yeah, thanks. And thanks for the opportunity to join both of you. It’s great to see you.

Let me start by saying, you know, Ken’s sketched out a whole lot on the Indian side. And I think if you were to try to boil it down in terms of imperatives facing the Modi government, it would be the domestic political imperative to show his own audiences at home that he is tough and that he does stand up for the people of India. He also has a strategic imperative to try to address this problem of terrorism, which has been exceptionally difficult for India to manage. And they’ve tried all different things. And so now, as Ken pointed out, he’s on a path toward a kind of a conventional escalation to meet the terrorist threat in a way that previous Indian governments have been reluctant to do. So that is different.

Switching now over to Pakistan though, what we see there isn’t exactly a mirror image. Pakistan is exceptionally—you know, quite different from India. (Laughs.) But Asim Munir, who is undoubtedly the most powerful individual in Pakistan, the army chief—

AYRES: And so not an elected leader.

MARKEY: Not an elected leader, although there is a prime minister, Shehbaz Sharif. Shehbaz Sharif very clearly is sort of a secondary figure in the Pakistani setup these days. Asim Munir also faces both political—in a slightly different way from Modi—but political imperatives as well as strategic ones. But here his principal interest is, I think, defending the interests of the Pakistani military. And if you think about it in this way, the Pakistani military has every reason to have to stand up to India. This is its reason for being. This is what it tells the people of Pakistan it is most capable of doing. This is where it expends the lion’s share of national resources. This is what it talks about to rally the people of Pakistan.

And so when it faces a threat from India, and in this case the threat was clearly a military one but also a diplomatic one in terms of threats to water sources. India put the Indus Waters Treaty into abeyance, meaning suspending it, which would have profound impacts for the people of Pakistan. So when Pakistan is faced with this, it is the responsibility—the requirement to the Pakistani army chief to stand tough against that. And so if you play the politics there, it is they have to respond. And, frankly, I think they believe they did. I think that they portrayed the initial round of military exchanges as one in which they downed, they say, five Indian aircraft. We don’t know exactly what the number is. And in which they claim to have defended Pakistan from worse from India.

And more than that, I think they come out of this episode with a sense that they got a promise from the president of the United States to bring up the issue of Kashmir in a broader sense, and to force some kind of mediated or facilitated dialog with India, which is something that Pakistan has wanted for a long time. So the fascinating, and in many ways disturbing, aspect, or one of them, of this crisis, is that both sides come out having learned lessons that may incline them to have seen this crisis as beneficial politically, if not strategically, to the interests of their leaders. Which is worrisome if you’re—if you’re concerned about seeing this happen again, which I am.

JUSTER: Alyssa, if I can—

AYRES: Yeah, sure.

JUSTER: —just add one point to Dan’s excellent explanation. Each side feels the need to respond, but neither side wants this to escalate into a major war. And they have to walk that fine line where they can take strong actions but, as Dan had said earlier, the Indians said—or, you said, Alyssa—that they’re taking this action at nine terrorist camps, but in a non-escalatory way. (Laughs.) And yet, the technology is escalating this very rapidly. And it’s that fine line that leads them each to develop narratives and try to control the messaging, so that they can portray themselves as having prevailed, or act in a strong way, without necessarily addressing the other side’s allegations or charges as to what actually happened.

AYRES: Well, let me pull that thread on defense technology, which you both have raised. And this does seem to be a point of differentiation between the 2019 crisis. Can we speak a little bit about new air defense platforms, new planes that India is operating? What do we think happened—drones? How have new defense platforms and technologies changed the way India and Pakistan interact with each other in this case? Maybe, Dan, we’ll go back to you for a second.

MARKEY: Sure, yeah. So, yes, we’ve absolutely seen major defense changes even in that, you know, five-, six-year period. The ones that have been cited most frequently are Pakistan’s use of, as Ken pointed out, Chinese-manufactured aircraft, which are of the next generation from what they were even using mainly in the last time, although they did have U.S. F-16s back then. So they’re similar to that. But what they now have are the air-to-air missile capabilities to strike Indian aircraft. And it seems, to down some of India’s frontline aircraft built by France, Rafale fighters, that were many kilometers—probably over 100 kilometers—inside of India when they appear to have been down. This is a big change. You know, you don’t need to cross the international border to be exposed or vulnerable to attack by the other side.

The other things you pointed out, the use of drones and so on, and air defense systems, both sides have variants of Russian-built air defense systems. The Indians have the S-400. The Pakistanis have a Chinese variant of the S-300. It appears that the Pakistani version was less capable of withstanding Indian attacks, and so we saw India make its way through those defenses, presumably, with BrahMos missiles as well as other air-to-ground missiles, and have struck a variety of Pakistani targets. And it is possible that in that is why we actually saw the ultimate concern of the United States, that certain parts of Pakistan were being hit in ways that led to such warning inside of Pakistan that the next stage in this crisis would have been something much more dramatic.

And when you hear that, on the U.S. side, you start to get very worried very quickly, given that Pakistan is nuclear armed. And you get concerned that Pakistan may do something rash, striking Indian civilians in ways that it hadn’t, at least militarily, or something even worse in terms of nuclear use. So that’s probably what was going on there. But at the same time, I would say, despite some of Pakistan’s successes on hitting Indian aircraft, it does appear that Pakistan had only limited success against Indian air defenses, particularly with its drones or other attempts. Not clear exactly what happened. I think we should be honest about this, there’s a lot that we don’t know. But Pakistan’s offensive capabilities, aside from defending against Indian aircraft, look to have been limited, at least so far.

AYRES: Ken.

JUSTER: Yes, if I can just add a few points to Dan’s excellent explanation.

First, the use of Pakistan of Chinese-produced, or jointly produced, planes and missiles was the first time that these Chinese weapons and assets have been used in combat. And so for the Chinese it’s a very important affirmation of what they have done, or at least test of their own equipment, which is not insignificant given China’s tensions with India. Now, certainly there seems to be some evidence, although we don’t know how many planes were shot down, that at least one or two were, because my understanding is that the French have themselves confirmed that a Rafale plane was downed. And the Pakistanis have claimed that they took out one of the S-400 Russian air defense systems. I don’t think the Indians have confirmed that.

But what’s interesting there is that China itself has the S-400 air defense system. And so when I was ambassador I questioned the Indian defense chief, why would you be getting the S-400 defense system when your concern is primarily about China, and they know this system very well so wouldn’t they know what some of the weaknesses are? I can tell you that, at the time, I received sort of a smile on the other end—(laughs)—without a clear answer. But this may show that the Chinese do actually understand the vulnerabilities of the S-400, if, in fact, a system was destroyed with Chinese missiles.

On the other side, India had Israeli drones that it was able to use. That, as Dan said, you know, may have been very successful in penetrating Pakistan. And it was really because some of the attacks on Pakistan defenses were near where its nuclear weapons are that people became concerned at the quick escalation that could occur if the war continued. And as I said, in 2019—and I see Paul Jones is on this call, and he was the chargé in Pakistan when I was in India. We both were confronted with each side being concerned that the other was moving nuclear weapons. And was this a routine movement or was this in preparation for use?

And that’s where we played, I think, a significant role in being able to have our own intelligence assets confirm certain things and then share them with each side, and gradually talk folks down from believing that there was nuclear escalation. But it’s not clear, you know, how successful we can be doing that in the future if matters move so quickly and there’s such vulnerability,

MARKEY: Alyssa, could I make one really quick addition to this?

AYRES: Yeah.

MARKEY: Because, as Ken was talking, that the China angle is critical here. And I think for those of us who have been actually more focused on the India-China problem set—that is, India’s concerns about China along its contested border—this exchange is, if anything, even more worrisome. The kinds of capabilities that China has sold to or gifted to Pakistan over the years actually pale in comparison to what China has on its own. So if you think that this was worrisome in terms of the threat that Pakistan now poses to India, you better be thinking even more seriously about the threat that China poses to India. And be realistic about India’s ability to withstand that threat, at least in the near term.

AYRES: I think that leads us directly to a broader conversation about the changing geopolitical landscape and how that is also shaping what takes place in South Asia. The conversation about upgraded defense technology is a conversation about changing geopolitical defense diplomacy and how that is creating new capabilities. But in this particular recent conflict and its escalation, we also saw a number of other countries offer to be helpful. The United States at first, as Ambassador Just said, said this is—you know, the vice president said this is an issue for them to decide. Then the United States appeared to be much more involved. But other countries also became involved. What do we know about efforts from other countries to try to assist with de-escalation, not quite a mediation, perhaps, just more statements, but what’s the fuller picture here of the geopolitical landscape and efforts by others to try to shape the outcome in this case? Ken, let me go to you first.

JUSTER: Yeah. Well, I think, as we’ve discussed, because the military capabilities have increased so much, this is an area, India-Pakistan, that could quickly escalate into a nuclear exchange. And no one wants to see that. There’s so much else going on in the world these days that India and others need to focus on. And so you saw a number of countries, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the U.K., even Iran, tried to give expressions of restraint, and to recognize that India was going to take some action but to try to make sure it did not escalate further. And especially because the United States initially was saying, we don’t have any reason to get involved in this, others were stepping up.

But India has always made clear that it does not want mediation of its disputes with Pakistan. It only wants direct negotiations. And while other countries, and I think the United States as well, can pass messages and can urge that certain actions be taken or not taken, from the Indian perspective—and I know it’s different than the commentary that came out of Pakistan—this was not something that the United States forced on the parties or mediated between them, but may have facilitated by passing messages and expressing concerns.

AYRES: Dan, your thoughts on this?

MARKEY: Yeah, no, I think it’s really important. We definitely did see a chorus of additional voices wanting to jump in and play some kind of a role in cooling down this crisis. And that does reflect a kind of a multipolarity trend that we’re seeing more broadly of medium- or even smaller-powered states wanting to have a greater role in terms of global diplomacy. And that’s an important trend to watch. And in some ways, was helpful at the early stages because you’re right, as and as Ken pointed out, Washington wanted to make itself a bit more absent, at least initially. A couple of additional points, though.

One would be, none of those medium- or smaller-size powers brings to the table an ability to see what’s going on in the midst of a conflict in the way that the United States does. So even if—and I agree with Ken. You know, this wasn’t a matter of the United States really using leverage to end this conflict. This was a matter of the United States being helpful and on the scene. But the United States can also assure either side in a conflict, in this kind of a conflict, of what they see—or, what we see going on from up above, or what we hear is happening, giving both sides some confidence that if they do come forward with a ceasefire proposal it will be adhered to, and that we’ll know—even if we can’t fully police it, or won’t fully police it—then we’ll know who’s at fault, and what’s happening, and be able to call them and tell them to knock it off. That’s something that the UAE, or Iran, or others really just can’t do, and probably won’t be able to do, to the extent the United States can do it, anytime soon.

Last point. China. China is the most important external actor in this crisis, actually. It is true, first, because, as we’ve already pointed out, Chinese weapons were used extensively—more extensively than American weapons. But it is also true because China has a deep and abiding relationship with Pakistan and a hostile relationship with India. And had China chosen to make its voice heard more publicly, we would have known it. China didn’t do terribly much. It was relatively muted throughout. But what we really don’t know, and what I would love to know, is what China was telling especially Pakistan, but possibly even India, from behind the scenes as this was ongoing. Because if there’s any external party that can influence Pakistan’s behavior with actual leverage, it’s China these days. And so they’re an important, if relatively quiet, partner in all of this.

JUSTER: Yeah. Two footnotes to what Dan was saying. The role of China geopolitically has evolved over the last twenty years. If you look at terrorist incidents that occurred in India in 2001 and 2008, India had a workable relationship with the Chinese at that time. But that relationship has increasingly deteriorated in the last, you know, five to ten years. And so it’s unclear, as Dan was saying—(laughs)—what China is saying behind the scenes, whether they actually welcomed seeing what their own weaponry could do in a battle with India. And it is just a different—and India, as a consequence also, doesn’t want to get bogged down in a war with Pakistan when it sees its primary challenge strategically and geopolitically with China. And that’s a reason why it wants to both act decisively but not escalate the situation.

And then finally I want to emphasize again what Dan said. Other countries expressing the desire for restraint by the parties is important, but the United States has the unique intelligence capabilities that even may exceed what India and Pakistan have with each other, to be able to inform the parties, reassure the parties, pass information. And also has a sufficient relationship with both parties to do it with some influence and persuasiveness. And that really is what occurred in 2019. And some form of that may have occurred here. It was in a very small, short window, but I think it was the concern about quick escalation that the U.S. was seeing that helped give some urgency to trying to have a ceasefire.

AYRES: Well, let me just quickly follow up. We’re going to open up to Q&A shortly. But I want to follow up on the issue of the U.S. involvement. And it seems that President Trump has a—he has, on a couple different occasions, talked about his interest in trying to resolve the Kashmir dispute. He mentioned this when he met Imran Khan in 2019 in the White House. (Laughs.) He’s said this again recently. They’ve been fighting for a thousand years. Today the White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt said that the president has inherited so many conflicts around the globe and he is tackling them one at a time. Is this a more formal push on the part of the United States to try to look to resolve the Kashmir conflict? What are the prospects for a resolution, or what are the prospects for better management of the conflict?

JUSTER: Well, I think the president has a natural inclination to want to be a dealmaker, and get involved, and resolve issues. But I also think that he is probably not deeply steeped in the history of the India-Pakistan relationship. I think that’s been indicated by some of the statements that he’s made. And the fact that India does not want a mediator of this matter, and that this is a relatively intractable issue to resolve. And, again, in 2019, I think it may have been, when he was meeting with Imran Khan, he said that Prime Minister Modi had asked him to mediate the dispute. And the Indians repudiated that statement. And they’ve done so again now, when they said that the U.S. did not mediate, and they do not want a mediator.

And while the White House may have put out a statement today, yesterday the State Department seemed to back—you know, take a step back from the idea of mediation, saying that they welcome direct communication between the parties. So it’s not clear to me that there is an overall regional strategy or decision-making process in the White House that leads to these pronouncements. Athey may be more coming from the president’s own natural inclination to want to address and resolve disputes, without maybe fully appreciating some of the complexity and the positions of the parties. The Pakistanis would welcome mediation, and they praised the White House for their involvement, but it’s something that the Indians have gone to great length to distance themselves from.

AYRES: We’ll open up for Q&A in one second. Dan, I wanted to ask if you had a comment on the question of U.S.—

MARKEY: Sure, yeah, I’ll just, yeah, embroider on Ken’s points. Only to observe that it won’t probably come as a huge surprise to most people in this audience that this administration, the Trump administration, is not process-oriented. And that can come with some huge downsides. I would point to two. One is that a process-oriented administration might have done a better job of learning from the crises that Ken has already talked about, especially the 2019 crisis. It could not have been a surprise, and certainly wasn’t to me or anybody who’s been following this closely, that an Indian threat to escalate would be met with some kind of Pakistani response.

And so the natural question that should have been raised from the outset of this crisis to the Indian side would have been, precisely how do you plan to avoid and manage that response? And had this administration heard something that was compelling, and possibly they did but I don’t think they did. I don’t think they asked, then maybe they could have gone along with it, or maybe they—if they didn’t, they should have tried to caution against it, and possibly even publicly caution against it, to try to ward off a situation which is—in stages two and three and four of an escalation, things get out of hand. We already know that. So why play the game again? So that would be point one.

Point two would be mixed messages from the start out of Washington were detrimental in the earlier stages of this crisis. We can already say that. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth made only supportive comments about India, which was interpreted by New Delhi, maybe willfully, but as a green light, as an endorsement of military action against Pakistan. While at the same time, Secretary of State Rubio, and now national security advisor, did say something more about restraint from the outset. And Vice President Vance said, it’s none of our business. So what was the message that Washington was supposed to take out of all of this, not to mention that when a ceasefire came through the president jumped the gun, got ahead of parties in the region—particularly the Indians.

And we should not underestimate how angry India is right now about President Trump’s jumping in like this. It is the story in Delhi. They want to say that they had success, but the fact that Trump has come out and suggested that India has submitted to some kind of a mediation is something that it’s a real black eye for them, and that they are blaming the Trump administration. And something that they’ll have to get past, to get back to better relations with Washington going forward. And it’s an unnecessary own-goal.

JUSTER: There was also a claim, apparently, that the president said the United States would cut off trade with each party if they did not agree to a ceasefire. And the Indians have adamantly said that the trade issue was never raised in their conversations.

AYRES: There are a lot of dimensions about this most recent conflict where we don’t even know clearly what the facts are, including about diplomacy, about the impact of defense technology, and who said what, when.

So we need to open now up for Q&A. We’ve got more than a hundred people who have joined us today. I’d like to invite members to join with your questions. This meeting is on the record. Just a reminder there. And the operator will remind everyone how to join the question queue.

Operator.

OPERATOR: Thank you.

(Gives queuing instructions.)

We will take our first question from Donald Lu.

AYRES: Don! Thank you for joining. I know you have a lot of thoughts on this.

Q: Hi, Alyssa. Hi, Dan. Hi, Ken. This is a very early session for CFR. I’m impressed that you have a hundred people. (Laughter.)

Hey, one of the key questions about whether this will happen again is what actually happened in Pahalgam. Do you have a theory about whether this was by design of the ISI and the Pakistani military? Or does this signify a loss of control by Pakistan over Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, other militant groups? Thanks.

AYRES: Dan, that sounds like a good question for you. I’m not sure we have the answers yet.

MARKEY: Yeah, look, Don knows we don’t know. If we knew, we’d say it. However, my best guess is that this was sanctioned, that this was not an accident. I base that on the way that it kind of played out. This was—so in the last time, in 2019, you had an attack that actually looks to have gotten worse than it was intended to be. In other words, there was a strike on Indian security forces, and a lot more people died than was anticipated. In this case, these were targeted killings. These were murders. This was intended to be every bit as bad as it was. And it was absolutely horrific. It was undertaken by individuals who seem to have very clearly had pretty high-quality communications capabilities, encrypted so that we do not have them talking, or at least we don’t have yet, any evidence of what they were exactly saying and to whom, in terms of handlers. And they’ve managed to escape. So far, they haven’t been captured. They may never be.

So that has all the hallmarks of a pretty high-level support. And beyond that, I would say this comes in a context where Pakistan has felt two things. One, India is completely unwilling to deal on issues that are of importance to Pakistan, including Kashmir. And, two, Pakistan itself has been the target of a series of terrorist attacks—escalating attacks on Pakistanis and on the Pakistani military, which they in turn attribute to India, as well as targeted assassinations of individuals, mainly terrorists inside of Pakistan, who have had—historically had ties with the Pakistani state. So there’s a means, a motive, and a method that all line up with top-level sanctions. So that’s why I think that. But I don’t know.

JUSTER: And if I can just add to Dan’s analysis, with which I agree. The Indians, while they have not revealed the evidence that leads them to state with confidence that this was a cross-border incident that Pakistan knew about, point to some communications that came from across the border. And so, again, they’re encrypted. And we may not be able to know the exact content of them. But that came to the terrorists. And, second, it’s—you know, it may not be that the civilian government in Pakistan knew about this, but the question is whether elements of the intelligence community or the army were involved. And that’s what seems to be the case, though without definitive proof. But the Indians feel the circumstances are sufficiently compelling that they needed to respond.

AYRES: Thank you. Can we go to our next question?

OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question from Paul Jones.

AYRES: Oh, Paul, thank you for joining. We’ve got deep expertise in our meeting here today.

Q: Hey. Delighted to—thank you so much for hosting. And it’s great to hear from Ken and Dan.

My question is just with a little slightly different take on the question you discussed earlier. In the light of the different geopolitical situation and some of the differences in, obviously, technologies and capabilities and all sides, I wonder if you each could comment on we know the Indian position on not wanting any outside, you know, mediation, and the Pakistani position in favor. What do you think the U.S. interest is in this? And in that, I just make one observation. In that I think sometimes the way it’s been discussed has been sort of all or nothing, that either, you know, the U.S. gets in, and sits down, and mediates, versus—you know, or doesn’t do anything, you know, until there’s a crisis. And I wonder if there are any, you know, creative steps that could be neither extreme but perhaps be helpful in lowering the chances of something like this happening again.

And then a separate observation, just I appreciate both your comments on the U.S. intelligence picture and ability to, you know, help the parties see what is happening, and our ability to communicate with them about what is actually happening. I was struck during 2019 that our assets were less than I had hoped. And that we had less visibility than I had hoped. And that was for obvious reasons. Our focus was obviously toward Afghanistan and the war. But I know we can play a role in that, but I just don’t want it to be overstated in our ability to see and therefore communicate to the parties in ways that are helpful during a crisis. Thank you.

AYRES: Great question.

JUSTER: OK, so let me take an initial crack, and I’ll start with the last point. No doubt, Paul, you’re correct. And, again, it’s good to hear from you. And we worked closely in 2019 on that. I might add, that that was a time when the president, the secretary of state, and the national security advisor were in Vietnam getting ready to meet with the North Koreans. And so—(laughs)—while they made a call or two, Paul, myself, and the head of the INDOPACOM, Admiral Davidson, were more actively involved. And in this current crisis, you actually have no ambassadors in place. And so it’s even a greater challenge to be able to communicate directly with the parties.

While the U.S. assets are not as good as either of us would have hoped, relative to others they’re much better. And we still were able to provide assurance on particular issues of concern to the parties. But it is true that this is one of the world’s really hot spots, because you have not just India and Pakistan, but China—three nuclear-weapon states all contiguous. And we need to pay attention to it. And that really gets to the first part of the question, which is, you know, what are the prospects for dealing with this issue more broadly?

You know, if there is an effort to make a holistic regional perspective, we have to—we’re not going to be able to, in my opinion, in any time in the near or medium term, resolve the Kashmir issue. But we have to come up with confidence-building measures to try to manage it, to try to now deal with some of these ancillary issues, such as the Indus Waters Treaty. And I’m pleased to see that the Pakistanis have at least said that they’re willing to discuss it. It’s unclear whether there’ll be easy agreement on modifications, but it’s a treaty that goes back to 1960. It’s been, you know, sixty-five years. Conditions have changed. The Indians have raised objections to it.

But we have to try to look at some of those issues to see if we can get back to some sort of trade relationship between the parties, and to at least manage this issue so it doesn’t distract from some of the broader geopolitical concerns in the region, from the management of the rise of China, from how we develop the Quad. And so I am hoping that there will be a more comprehensive regional policy that the administration focuses on, and makes this a component of how to how to deal with that—this issue in that context.

AYRES: Dan, do you have thoughts on this?

MARKEY: Yeah, just really briefly. I would say I agree with everything Ken said. The problem, of course, at this moment, is that attempting to bring India and Pakistan back together for anything more comprehensive, even at the basic level of confidence building measures and things like this, to India screams of rewarding terrorism. And will be resisted even more firmly than might have been the case a year ago. And so, you know, in the—in the timeline of various crises and hostile relationships, you get moments which are more, as they say, ripe for some sort of not just settlement, but at least making progress. And for at least a time, this will look not very ripe, to me, because of the raw sentiments of the conflict. And because India feels like any weakness on these issues, including talking even about—you know, Prime Minister Modi has made the point publicly that he will not want to talk about the Indus Waters Treaty and its resumption if there is no talk about terrorism. And so there is this very direct linkage there.

Last, very quick, point would be on the intelligence capabilities of the United States. Ken has it exactly right, as far as I know. But this is a broader argument here about the utility of American intelligence for policy purposes. This is not just a matter of we want to know what’s going on just so we know it, or it’s a nice thing to have. These are essential capabilities that, if anything, require more investment, particularly in this part of the world, because they are quite useful. And they are unique, at least, to the United States, relative to other powers. And that’s a distinction and a capability we want to maintain.

JUSTER: One other point on the downside of trying to resolve some of the issues between India and Pakistan. Personalities matter. And right now, the army chief for Pakistan, Munir, is a hardliner, which was different than the previous—his predecessor, Bajwa, who had, I think, a more realistic view of the need to try to calm the tensions between India and Pakistan, so that Pakistan could better focus on developing its own economy.

MARKEY: Agreed with that as well.

AYRES: Great. Let’s go to our next question, then.

OPERATOR: Our next—we’ll take our next question from Farooq Kathwari.

AYRES: Farooq, thank you for joining.

JUSTER: I think you may be on mute.

Q: Sorry—

OPERATOR: Mr. Kathwari—

Q: I’m on mute. I’m sorry. Yeah, I’m Farooq Kathwari. I’m CEO of Ethan Allen. Originally from Kashmir Valley.

I mean, this is really a disaster for the Kashmir region, especially for the people of Kashmir and the Kashmir Valley. There is a way out. About close to twenty years back I was involved with a number of key people in establishing what we call the Kashmir Study Group. And it came with ideas that were what we considered to be feasible, peaceful, doable. And both—and, at that time, Prime Minister Sharif, Musharraf, Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh, they all agreed to the ideas that the main area of conflict is the Valley of Kashmir. And came to the idea that we should give the Valley of Kashmir an ability to govern itself, and not change the major borders. Was hard to do. They came to that. And I think that’s an idea that is still feasible. If they do that, it will have an opportunity of creating peace. And then India and Pakistan can spend time and energies on taking care of their people, and not what they’re doing right now.

AYRES: Thank you, Farooq. And, of course, this is the Kashmir Study Group that you referenced. Ken and Dan, your thoughts on another path?

JUSTER: Just two quick comments. What was interesting about this terrorist incident is that Kashmiris themselves came out very vocally and forcefully condemning it, because the economy in Kashmir is devastated when something like this occurred. All the tourists leave. The place is shut down. And so there is perhaps an opportunity to build on that condemnation by the Kashmiris themselves of what occurred. That said, because of this type of incident I think the Indian government is even more convinced that it needs to have its own forces in the region and be controlling it. And, you know, will have some reluctance in pursuing the course that Farooq has mentioned. So there is that tension where, on the one hand, India was starting to let the region develop more and encourage that, but I think this type of incident may well set that back and convince the Indians that they need even stronger army presence and control.

AYRES: Dan.

MARKEY: I tend to agree. India has been on a path toward a more full and, in many ways, ruthless control over Kashmir, over the valley, and a very different path than the one that Farooq was involved with in the past, in terms of suggesting—if anything, less autonomy politically, rather than more, is the path that the Indian government is currently on.

You know, I look back at that period as evidence, in some ways, that something better was possible. I agree that leaders on both sides were actually pretty close to believing that they could get somewhere on Kashmir—soft borders, a variety of governance mechanisms that would have actually benefited the people on the ground and resolved some of the underlying tensions between India and Pakistan. But I also see it as evidence, you know, that Kashmir is not the only problem. In other words, Kashmir might be resolved, but yet India and Pakistan still have other reasons for hostility. This is a territorial dispute, but it’s also a national dispute. It runs very, very deep.

And so the upsurge is in violence that happen in Kashmir are, I think, still as much a symptom as a cause. And, you know, recognizing that, I think, gives us a sense as to how hard it will be to under—you know, to actually resolve the conflict between India and Pakistan more broadly.

AYRES: And that is not a vision of optimism here for—

MARKEY: No, I’m sorry, it’s not.

AYRES: —near-term or medium-term resolution. Thank you. Should we go to another question? We’ve got about ten, nine minutes left.

OPERATOR: Yes. We’ll take our next question from Diana Negroponte.

AYRES: Diana, thank you for joining.

OPERATOR: Ms. Negroponte.

Q: Thank you very much. Now the mute system is made rather complex at the moment,

I’d like to build on what Farooq talked about in his experience, which is the track-two negotiations, most effective in the early 2100 cycle, and also ask about the relationship between the intelligence services, both in—both in Pakistan and in India. I’d appreciate your thoughts on that.

AYRES: Ken or Dan, would either of you like to take that one?

MARKEY: I can jump in on track two. Look, there was a period that you’re describing where track two was pretty vibrant, pretty healthy. I remember taking trips to Delhi and being surprised to be on a bus and see Pakistanis. What were they doing there? They were there for track-two conversations. And there continue to be some of these dialogs ongoing, in third countries, often. They have been meeting principally among experts to discuss the situation. But, you know, there are limits to what a track two can do when the official channels are really blocked. So they need to keep happening. They need to—actually, that would be the one of the first things that you’d want to get restarted after this crisis, to see—kind of feel out what are the opportunities, if there are any, for getting past this and getting to greater stability. And so that’s a—it’s a good idea overall.

With respect to the intelligence services, look these are—this is the gray, shadowy game of a war that’s been ongoing in the region for decades. Both of them are engaged in it. I think, from a Pakistani perspective, they would suggest that a principal change under the Modi government is that India’s intelligence services have been more freed to undertake violent operations, assassinations inside of Pakistan. And they would suggest, and I think some Indian analysts would agree with this, that this is a big change. And whether or not it’s a wise change on India’s part, is another matter. Clearly, mainly they have targeted individuals that they certainly believe are terrorists. And they’ve done so in ways that you could argue are less dangerous than actually going to war. But they’re also provocative. And I think may have, as I said before, been partially responsible for leading Pakistan to undertake its operations, which looked to me like a reprisal against India. So it’s a nasty and dangerous game.

Last point, some of the most important channels of communication have happened historically through the intelligence services on both sides. And so that is—you know, despite their being engaged in this sort of shadow war, there are also important potential channels for communication if and when there are opportunities for stabilizing the situation.

JUSTER: And if I can just add that—to Dan’s excellent points—look, track-two dialogs always are a positive thing to do. But it’s just not clear to me at this point in time how much they would resonate with government officials. Since the Indians abrogated Article 370 of their constitution and declared the region of Jammu and Kashmir part of India, overall there’s been a strong military—even a stronger military presence and effort to control the area. And unfortunately, I think an incident such as what has occurred recently simply reinforces those instincts. So it’s helpful to have track-two dialogs and get people talking to each other, but I’m not sure in the near term they’re going to have that much of an impact, especially, again, as Dan said, when each side is very suspicious of the other side’s intelligence services’ operations, their covert activities. And while they maintain connections right now, it’s at a low point of trust overall.

AYRES: Thank you. And I think we probably have time for one, possibly two, more questions. Let’s see. Let’s go to the next question, please.

OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question from Dharma Demeeja (ph).

AYRES: Hi. Thank you for joining.

Q: Thank you, Alyssa. And thank you, Dan and Ambassador Juster. Really appreciate your comments and observations today.

Could you speak a little bit to the economic impact on the region this episode has had, or will have? The potential impact on the manufacturing wave in India that was expected, and the investor confidence? In case of China, how do you see the potential impact on the shifting of the supply chains? And, in case of Pakistan, its own economic stability. So this particular episode I think also has an importance for what it means for the economic aspect of the region. Greatly appreciate any observation or comments that you can share.

AYRES: Great question. Ken.

JUSTER: Yeah. So for the region itself, as I indicated, this has been devastating. Tourism was starting to come back to Kashmir. India was promoting that. And now people have left and the place is in lockdown. And so that has a very negative impact on the region itself. And it’s—you know, would you take a vacation there now, is the question. And so that’s going to take a while to change, and unfortunately. In terms of India’s broader effort to attract manufacturing and to be an alternative supply chain to China, I don’t think that will be affected. While there was military action in areas in the Punjab, I think more broadly outside of this region, there won’t be an impact on doing business in India. But, you know, that remains to be seen.

You know, for the Pakistani economy I defer to Dan, who may be more familiar than myself. But this has been a problem all along, if Pakistan is devoting so many resources to its defense sector and really not being able to act in a way that can attract investment and give people encouragement that the economy can be growing. And over the years we’ve seen Pakistan’s economy increasingly slip relative even to Bangladesh. And what’s changed in fact over time was the size of the Indian economy relative to the Pakistani economy. It’s ten or eleven times bigger. That hasn’t translated necessarily into the military capabilities on each side, but it does present challenges for Pakistan overall. And it’s one reason, final comment, why other countries that used to be closer to Pakistan—some of the Gulf countries—have really become closer to India because of its economic growth and potential. And Pakistan is just a less consequential player in those discussions.

AYRES: Dan.

MARKEY: Yeah. Look, on the India side I agree with Ken’s points. This may not be deeply detrimental to their ability to play the role of a plus-one in global supply chains or other things. But it is a distraction. It’s a dangerous and potentially worrisome distraction going forward, in part because this crisis is not necessarily, or by any means, the last crisis. And so people have to factor that in. It’s unfortunate that the Indian government is spending so much time—or, has to spend so much time on this issue. I think they—I know they wish that Pakistan would simply disappear from the earth—(laughs)—but it won’t. And so they’re going to have to continue to manage this problem going forward. And that will have detrimental consequences economically, if at the margins.

With Pakistan, I think the thing to keep in mind is that the leadership of Pakistan—the army, really—is not fundamentally motivated by a deep understanding of the economy. It is not central to the way that they see the world. They understand that a destroyed economy will harm them. But they have for decades, basically from the beginning, not seen themselves as the guardian of the economy so much as the guardian of the state and of the arsenal. And they feed off of the economy. And Pakistan’s economy has been a mess. Continues to be reliant on the IMF. This will by no means improve their situation. But once you get to a certain level, which is very far—which is very low, it’s hard to go much lower.

And so I think, unfortunately, you know, that’s where Pakistan is. And that explains a lot about their behavior, right? When you have nothing to lose, you can be more risk acceptant. And that’s the way that Pakistan looks to me. It’s not a good story. It’s a difficult-to-manage story. But it’s important to understand.

AYRES: So I think we’re wrapping up our conversation today on a pretty sobering note here. Let me thank both Ken and Dan for taking the time to share your expertise, and tremendous expertise among our participants who joined today. So thanks to all of you as well. The video and transcript of this session will be posted on CFR’s website, shortly. Thank you everyone for joining us. Have a great rest of your day.

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