Media Briefing: Trump in the Middle East

CFR experts discuss President Donald Trump’s upcoming trip to the Gulf region, including what the trip could signify for Iran nuclear negotiations, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and U.S. policy in the Middle East. 

BEN CHANG: I am Ben Chang, CFR’s vice president of global communications and novice at using Zoom. (Laughter.) Welcome to today’s Council on Foreign Relations briefing on the president’s upcoming trip to the Middle East. Thank you for joining us for what will be a robust and informative conversation.  

We have a strong lineup of CFR experts for you today with one beaming in all the way from Oman. After our experts weigh in we will take questions for the last twenty-five minutes of our briefing. Please raise your Zoom hand at that time, unmute yourself, and we will do our best to get to as many as possible. A recording will be posted online at the conclusion of this session and, again, this discussion is on the record.  

CFR seeks to inform the U.S. role in the world and does so through briefings such as this and the up-to-date analysis and resources posted across our channels including CFR.org and ForeignAffairs.com where you will find policy briefs, special reports, media appearances, Foreign Affairs articles, and a Rolodex of our expert voices. 

Please continue to turn to the Council as a resource as we navigate these times and issues, going forward. 

With that, I want to thank my colleague Lauran Potter for organizing this briefing, and I’m going to turn the microphone over—the Zoom microphone to a friend, former and current colleague Farah Pandith to kick things off.  

Thanks again.  

PANDITH: Thanks so much, Ben.  

Good morning to everybody. My name is Farah Pandith. I’m a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. I’m delighted to serve as your moderator today. 

We’re joined with three CFR experts. Their distinguished biographies can be found at CFR.org. But by way of brief introduction, Elliott Abrams served as deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security advisor in the administration of George W. Bush where he supervised U.S. policy in the Middle East for the White House, and as special representative for Iran and Venezuela in the first administration of Donald Trump.  

Ray Takeyh served as a senior advisor on Iran at the U.S. Department of State. His areas of specialization are Iran, U.S. foreign policy, and the modern Middle East.  

And Steven Cook is an expert on Arab and Turkish politics as well as U.S.-Middle East policy. He is also a columnist at Foreign Policy magazine and, as Ben said, today he is in Oman. 

And I’m delighted to be able to organize a moderated session in the first twenty-five minutes or so, and then we will turn to the audience for questions.  

Elliott, I’d like to start with you. We have seen the president has made the choice again this time in the second administration to go to Saudi Arabia. Apparently, it’s a hallmark of this president, and he has defined this particular season of his activity as very transactionally oriented.  

He said he’s going to announce something as big as it gets on this trip. It’s unclear whether it will be a policy change, a change in an economic deal, or a Trumpian embellishment. I don’t know if there are going to be orbs that we’re going to see in Saudi Arabia.  

But if you could speak to this decision to go to Saudi Arabia, what we expect from this component of the trip and, in fact, did the Saudis lobby for him to go to Saudi Arabia first? 

ABRAMS: Well, thanks, Farah.  

We should begin by saying he did exactly this eight years ago in May 2017, his first foreign trip not counting the Pope’s funeral—his first foreign trip then and now, Saudi Arabia. It is a different lineup, though.  

That trip in May 2017 was Saudi Arabia and Israel. This trip is Saudi Arabia, Emirates, Qatar, and no Israel. So it’s different. I think it is more transactional in the sense that I would expect the announcement to be an economic or financial announcement.  

Saudi Arabia is not ready to join the Abraham Accords so he could announce, theoretically, some kind of defense deal with Saudi Arabia. He could announce a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia.  

Why Saudi Arabia first again? I’m sure the Saudis like being first and I’m pretty confident they would have asked for it. But I think if you look at 2025 the Saudis are the closest of the three to us. The president’s relationship with MBS is stronger than his relations with the two other heads of state.  

The policy of Saudi Arabia is a bit closer now on questions like China. Qatar is pretty controversial for all the money they put into Gaza and for all the money they put into American universities which is now coming into question.  

So I think picking Saudi Arabia is the right thing to do because they are the closest to us and in many ways most important of the Gulf countries.  

PANDITH: Thank you, and you’re setting the stage for the rest of the trip. 

In going to Saudi, Steven, I’m curious your take on his choice to go to Saudi Arabia. But I also was wondering if you thought there were going to be any outputs from the GCC meeting in Saudi Arabia, and, certainly, Elliott, you can comment on that as well.  

But, Steven, what does the president want from this visit? I mean, what does he expect to achieve? And also, importantly, as we think about this, who’s the audience for this trip?  

COOK: Well, thanks, Farah, and a very good evening to everybody from Muscat, Oman, which is not on the president’s itinerary but is playing a very, very important role in the nuclear talks with Iran and the recent stand down or ceasefire with the Houthis.  

I think—Farah, I think, you know, Elliott was spot on in that the Saudis are the heavyweight in the region that the president is closest to. It is, for lack of a better term, the big dog in the Gulf and so it would make sense for him to visit Riyadh first.  

I think what he’s, clearly, looking to get out of this is deals—the announcement of multiple multibillion dollar deals. I think the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia has already telegraphed that by first announcing his intention to invest $600 billion into the United States and then up to a trillion dollars. I think the Qataris and the Emiratis will also announce those deals.  

I think—and it’s important to recognize that the president’s approach to foreign policy is heavily influenced by, you know, for lack of a better term, this kind of—his version of economic statecraft, which is to look towards the wealthy states in the Gulf and their very large sovereign wealth funds as sources of investment in the United States, and that’s where you get to the audience.  

The president can announce multiple multibillion dollar deals that will benefit the American people and he wants to communicate to his base and beyond that after years of railing against how America’s partners and allies had made suckers of the United States now America’s partners, particularly those in the Gulf, are investing in the United States and consistent with his America first—with his America first message.  

I don’t think, though, that this meeting will just be about deals. As you mentioned, there is a multilateral component to it. There is a GCC meeting. I think that the GCC leaders are going to want to talk to the president about Syria. They’re going to want to get updated on the status of the nuclear negotiations. They’re going to want to talk about the Red Sea. And they’re going to mostly want to talk about Gaza.  

I’ve been in Oman for the past almost week. It is a constant source of discussion among Omani officials and others—and others here. And I think that the administration is prepared to announce something on this. The president made a remark just the other day about getting aid into Gaza. The Palestinians need to be taken care of. And his ambassador in Israel, Mike Huckabee, said today that the—that there is going to be a new plan on aid to Gaza. The Israelis will not be directly involved in it. And it doesn’t matter whether there is combat occurring. So there may be something more on Gaza than people, than people suspect. But I think overall what people are talking about, and the kind of idea that this is really about the president bringing home foreign direct investment and weapon sales, is, I think, the top line of this visit.  

Now, last point, these huge numbers that they’re talking about, you know, these things are going to be backloaded. Who knows whether they’ll ever actually happen. The region is flooded with agreements and investment agreements that never actually happen. But I think that the president, knowing how he kind of operates, I think that just the idea that, he’ll be welcomed in clearly an ostentatious manner, and there’ll be ostentatious announcements of these deals, are good enough. At least for the moment. 

PANDITH: Before I get to Ray, I think, Elliott, I wanted to give you a chance to comment on the GCC. But I also was curious what—this last point that Steven made about these grand announcements. I mean, the bigger the better. In any other administration everything is baked before you go overseas. (Laughs.) You know what you’re going to announce. What is happening behind the scenes over here?  

ABRAMS: Well, the answer to that is easy. No one has a clue. And if you look at the statements of administration officials, they contradict each other, and they contradict themselves from one day to the next on matters like Iran, which we’ll—which we’ll get to soon.  

Look, when you get an agreement—classic, the trade agreement with the U.K. It isn’t really an agreement. It’s an announcement. The announcement is we’re going to have an agreement. And I think we will. But don’t ask for the details. When the Saudis announced 600 billion (dollars) or 800 billion (dollars), that’s not this week. I mean, that’s an investment over time. Now, come back in five years. In five years, President Trump will no longer be president and we can ask how much of it was actually invested. I’m not suggesting it’s some kind of trick. I don’t think it is. But, you know, if you look at the—at previous announcements, as Steven said, sometimes they happen fully and sometimes they happen only in part, and very, very slowly. 

PANDITH: Yeah. OK. I’d like to—you mentioned Iran, and I want to turn to Ray and ask you about Iran. The Economist this week has an article that leads, the headline: Iran’s leader hopes America can save his failing regime. He has no choice but to engage with the great Satan. Do you agree with that? And I’m wondering too, just more broadly, where is the relationship between the United States and Iran at this time? Not just on the negotiations, but our framing of who they are and what the Trump administration wants. 

TAKEYH: Sure. Thanks. Thanks very much. I’m not quite sure if the Iranian leadership is looking for America to save the regime, as such. These negotiations have been different from previous one only in terms of pace. There’s meetings quite regularly, almost every week. The Iranian position remains the same as it was during the Biden administration. They’re willing to have what they would call then proximity talks, today we call them indirect talks. They are willing to talk about transparency measures to build a greater degree of international confidence in their nuclear program. And they are willing to talk about enrichment that they’re doing, not cessation of it. So the Iranian position is fairly consistent. 

The American positions, there are about four so far. There is the Mike Waltz position of total dismantlement. Marco Rubio’s position that Iran should rely on enrichment from abroad, maybe some sort of a regional bank. That proposal was initially offered to the Iranians during the Ford administrations. That’s Gerald Ford. It’s been rejected then. It’s been rejected every day since. Then there are those who Iran can have some kind of enrichment. That is what Special Representative Witkoff at various times has suggested. And more recently, Vice President Vance said they can have nuclear civil program and enrichment that’s suitable for that. Now, that’s 3.67, that’s 20 percent, or whatever it is. So the Americans are busy arguing with themselves, and maybe they’ll sort that out by the time they get there, but it’s unclear what the American position is at this point. There seems to be some kind of an argument about whether Iran can have enrichment and what that looks like.  

There are a number of concessions that the administration has already made. Number one, the administration began by saying they wished to have direct talks. That has not happened. And also other areas of concern, namely missiles and regional issues, as far as I know, have not been part of these negotiations. So the modality of these negotiations and the agenda sort of has resembled what the Iranians have suggested. There was an editorial in one of the Iranian hardline papers associated with the Revolutionary Guards that said the Americans have their foot on the gas pedal, but we have our hands on their steering wheel, so far as the negotiations are concerned. I don’t know if that’s actually true, but that seems to be the case. 

Then also it must be suggested—and I’ll end on this—that there are three negotiations taking place. There is a U.S.-Iran dialog that is taking place. There is another dialog taking place between the Iranian government and Director General Grossi. And the third one is trying to resume some kind of a dialog with the Europeans. There are overlap between all these—all these baskets, but what the Iranian government would like to do is keep all three as separate as possible, so if one track stalls the impression of overall diplomatic momentum continues.  

Now, what is the Iranian motivation? I think the Economist headline is misleading. I don’t think they’re looking for American sanctions relief as a means of saving the economy, although they certainly would like sanctions relief. I think these negotiations are designed to essentially protect the Iranian nuclear program from any form of retaliation during a time of vulnerability. And also, I think now they think they can probably get an agreement that is satisfactory to them and be subject to congressional approval and sanction, the way it wasn’t in the previous iteration. So now there’s a switch from the perspective that let’s just drag these negotiations out. Now they’re saying, we can actually maybe get a deal that the American political system will affirm through some sort of a congressional act, possibly a treaty process.  

PANDITH: Let’s talk about that for just a moment, Ray, in terms of the American political system that is—that is churning. There’s a huge difference today in the way in which we are thinking about how we negotiate and what we want. I’d like—I don’t want to get political here, but I do want your expertise. We have not had—I mean, Witkoff is not a trained negotiator with one of the most well-polished negotiating teams out there. Are we at a disadvantage because he’s the one who’s on the ground doing this back and forth, first? And then, secondly, there’s a domestic component to this that the Iranians rightly are looking at. Do you see pressure domestically impacting the way the president is able to get a deal, or what he’s trying to achieve? 

TAKEYH: Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian foreign minister who’s conducting these negotiations, is the most experienced diplomat dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue on the planet. He’s been dealing with it for twenty-some-odd years. His deputy, Ravanchi, has been dealing with this issue. So they’re like The Rolling Stones. They have the same lineup. They show up every day and sing, “I can’t get no satisfaction.” (Laughter.) They’re just doing their thing.  

The American position seems bewildering. Now, whether that’s because of staffing issues or whatever, absence of a consensus within the regime—within the government, I don’t. In terms of the domestic politics of the United States and whether an agreement with Iran negotiated by this administration can be subject to acceptance by both parties, we’ve been talking about this. I suspect my answer is, yes, the Trump administration can get away with parameters that maybe other administration think they cannot get away with. I would have to say that I think the Obama administration that pressed for the JCPOA wasn’t that concerned with congressional approbation either, and they didn’t necessarily tailor their demands, their negotiating position, to fit the domestic concern—even the concerns of the Democratic Party caucus on the Hill which, prior to the JCPOA, had taken a position of zero enrichment, basically, in a variety of sanctions resolutions. So, you know, does this administration have greater leeway? I suspect that’s true, but it remains to be seen. 

PANDITH: Thank you. We have about five minutes before we turn to questions. So for those who are listening, get your questions ready. And I have two questions that I still want to ask before we get to that section.  

Can we please turn to the Red Sea, if we’re still calling it the Red Sea? It may be another color by tomorrow. I don’t know. (Laughter.) Steven, can we—can we talk about the Houthis, please? I am curious, you know, all of this back and forth in the last few days. Give us your perspective on what’s happening and what you think is going to stick. 

COOK: Yeah. I think that what has happened is the administration offered the Houthis a deal here. Stop shooting—we’ll stop shooting at you, you stop shooting at us. And the Houthis said, OK. I think there is—at least the signals that I’m picking up here in Muscat is that although most people would say, you know, the Iranians don’t have the kind of influence with the Houthis that, you know, obviously with Hezbollah, or Hamas, or other members of the Axis of Resistance, the signals that I’m picking up here in Muscat is that the Iranians did suggest to the Houthis that they would like a better atmosphere for negotiations with the United States. And that’s why the Houthis have stood down, and, in turn, the United States has stood down.  

This has had maybe a salutary effect on freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, which is—freedom of navigation is a global interest of the United States. But what’s left hanging out there is the Houthi threat to Israel. And I suspect one of the reasons why the Biden administration did not go for this kind of deal is because it has left the Israelis out. And just today the Houthis fired yet another ballistic missile at Israel and a U.S. THAAD system shot it down. We saw Israel’s spectacular raid on the airport in Sana’a. And I would expect that we’ll see something like that again. 

If the United States is going to have a deal, the Trump administration is going to deal with the Houthis that leaves the Israelis out, the Israelis are going to be clear that they are not bound by it. They’re unlikely to do that while the president is in the region. And we’ll have to see whether the Houthis really stick to this. People forget, and there’s a collective case of amnesia here in Muscat. They link the threat to shipping in the Red Sea directly to the situation in Gaza, forgetting that the Houthis did attack commercial shipping in the Red Sea before October 7, and the Hamas attack on Israel. The pace of those attacks were significantly less than what they have been, but—so the Houthis may or may not adhere to this. At least for the moment they seem to be suggesting that they will, but maybe they won’t. That they weren’t defeated. You know, the kinds of thing—answering back at what the Trump administration had said to them.  

I do want to point out one other thing, at the risk of taking up a little bit more time. It’s interesting how deeply involved in this the Omanis have been, in sort of pushing the administration and pushing the Houthis. This is the role that Muscat has really carved out for itself over many, many years. But I think that it’s something that the Trump administration is doing with all the Gulf states. I know in your answer to your first question. Farah, there was a lot of discussion about, you know, the big sovereign wealth funds of the region.  

But think about it, the Saudis are playing a role in mediating with the Ukrainians and the Russians. The Emiratis have been instrumental in bringing Americans wrongfully imprisoned in Russia home. The Qataris obviously have had this big role to play in Gaza and trying to get to a ceasefire there. And now you have the Omanis, who are deeply involved in not only the nuclear negotiations but also the Houthis. It seems that the Trump administration sees America’s partners in the Gulf as their kind of trusted interlocutors, not treaty allies in Europe or other partners. And it’s a—is a different look for American foreign policy to go to these Gulf states as mediators on issues, both within the region and beyond.  

PANDITH: It’s a really excellent point. I thank you for raising it, Steven. 

Elliott, can we turn to Israel before we close this portion of our session together? Are we supposed to make something out of the fact that the president is not going to Israel? Should we be concerned about what press is reporting as a fraying of a relationship between the president and Netanyahu? What’s your take? 

ABRAMS: A short answer, yes. That is, he could have gone to Israel. He did last time. Hegseth was going to go to Israel. That trip is now off. Ron Dermer was in Washington this week, for one thing, to talk about being, frankly, left hanging by the U.S. deal with the Houthis. So I think there’s some tension here. The Israelis worry that the Houthi deal is a model for an Iran deal, that also leaves them hanging. And of course, they worry about Gaza, and what the American position will evolve into. And they know that the president is going to be spending a week in the Gulf hearing about Gaza, Gaza, Gaza, Gaza every day. So it’s not the best moment in U.S.-Israel, or Trump-Israel, relations. 

PANDITH: We have to turn to questions, and I’m going to go over to Monica in a moment, but just very, very quickly I’d like to hear from all three of you. This is a short—it feels to me that this is a short-term set of impacts that we’re going to see in the Middle East, and not a larger strategy for the U.S. and the Middle East. Is that right? I just want your take on the big picture of what’s happening. Ray, why don’t we start with you, and then we’ll go to Elliott and Steven, and then go to questions, please.  

TAKEYH: I suspect that’s correct, that one of the issues is these negotiations that are taking place, whether on the nuclear issue or others, are protracted and prolonged. They take a lot of time and effort. And one of the things about the administration, it has these compressed deadlines and then they get tired of it and move on, like the Ukraine negotiation. So there’s a danger of lack of attention to what is inevitably going to be a prolonged process.  

PANDITH: Yeah. Elliott. 

ABRAMS: I agree with that. And I think the—I think was Ray who used the words, maybe it was you, used the word “staffing.” I think that’s a problem, too. To have that kind of longer-term policy you need a staff who’s doing that thinking with the principals. I think if you look at the NSC today, DOD today, State today, they’re shorthanded. And the lead on these negotiations, Mr. Witkoff, is someone with no background in such negotiations or in the region, except in his business. So I think that’s going to be an increasingly difficult problem.  

PANDITH: Yeah. And, Steven. 

COOK: I mean, just very quickly, I think the sense that there’s these pieces that the president is negotiating don’t really fit together, and that his priority really is essentially domestic focused, securing, you know, agreements to invest in the United States would suggest that regionally the president would like these issues to go away. And that’s why he has these compressed timelines. He doesn’t want to focus on them.  

PANDITH: Thank you so much. 

Monica, can I turn to you to help with the questions, please?  

OPERATOR: Thank you, Farah.  

(Gives queuing instructions.) 

And we’ll take the first question from Gideon Rose. 

Q: Hi, guys. Great discussion. Thank you. Gideon Rose, Council on Foreign Relations and American Academy in Berlin. 

For most of our careers—this picks up on what you guys were saying—for most of our careers, U.S. policy towards the Middle East, there was the U.S., a kind of liberal hegemon, trying to move the region towards something. There was Israel, our sort of sometimes difficult democratic ally, but a key player. And there were the various Middle East authoritarian regimes. And the question was, how did you negotiate all that and bring everybody together towards some framework?  

It seems to me that with the Trump administration, and with democratic backsliding in both Israel and the U.S. in general, the way you guys were talking there is no real difference among any of the players. Essentially, we’re in realist world. And the only question is who has how much power and what deal can be cut. But it seems to me like Israeli and American exceptionalism, which used to be part of what the discussions of Middle East policy was, is no longer an issue, and it’s all just what deals can people make on what realist basis. Am I wrong on that? 

PANDITH: Great question. Who wants to answer?  

ABRAMS: Well, I think the Trump administration in round one. term one, had an overarching view of the region, which was the Abraham Accords. Which really covered a lot of territory and would have had an enormous impact had the Saudis joined. They don’t have a theory of the case now, because the Abraham Accords are kind of marginalized by the war in Gaza. But I don’t think—I think when you have seen what the Israelis have achieved with respect to Hamas, Hezbollah, Assad, and the attacks on Iran, Israeli exceptionalism is looking pretty good for the moment. 

COOK: Let me just quickly pick up on that. I think, Gideon, you’re right. It’s whatever deals. And that’s being led by the hegemon, the United States, looking for deals regardless of what the opportunities there are actually to take advantage of those changes that the force of Israeli arms have made in the region. There is a real opportunity here, but the Trump administration in no way, shape, or form wants to push it, because it’s not interested in reshaping the region. And so it’s perfectly willing to cut deals with the Iranians, thereby extending the life of the regime. You know, I think here’s the way I’ll put it, and I’ll end here. The Israelis have wanted victory and the United States wants deals. 

PANDITH: Great. I’m going to push us along because there are a lot of questions. Monica, if we can take the next one, please. And please make sure the questions are short. Thank you.  

OPERATOR: We’ll take the next question from Christopher Isham. 

PANDITH: Hi, Chris. 

Q: Good afternoon, folks. This is Chris Isham speaking, with CT Group. 

A question about the—some of these speaking of deals. One of the deals on the table, potentially, is the number of—the sale of advanced semiconductors chips to Gulf states. They’re eager. Obviously, they’re building up their AI capacity and they’re eager to import advanced U.S. semiconductor chips. Any view on whether you think the administration is on the cusp of raising the current restrictions on those chips, or not?  

PANDITH: Who would like to answer? 

COOK: I would say—all I had to say, this is going to be subject of discussions, of course. There is an AI war, and war over datacenters happening here in the region. Everybody wants—everybody’s appealing to the big AI players that they can have datacenters. Energy is cheap here. Land is abundant. But part of that is that they also want advanced chips to advance their own efforts in AI. Whether they’ll—and I think the—I don’t see a lot of resistance to that, to be completely honest with you, as long as the United States gets some sort of assurances with regard to China. And we see that with the deal that they struck with the UAE. We see that with the efforts on the part of the Biden administration in its—what has been termed as a security pact, which was much, much more. And that involved advanced technologies as well. So I don’t think that either—I don’t think the Trump administration is averse to this, as long as they get assurances on the Chinese presence, and what these countries are going to do with the Chinese going forward.  

PANDITH: Thanks, Steven. 

Monica, next question, please.  

OPERATOR: We’ll take the next question from Laura Rozen. 

PANDITH: Hi, Laura. 

Q: Thank you so much for doing this. It’s a great panel.  

I don’t know who wants to take this, if anyone, but it’s about the Trump administration’s staffing. And, you know, we saw reports that Waltz got pushed out in part over perceived Trump frustration with his allegedly having coordinated with the Israelis leaning towards a military action on Iran, as opposed to a deal. And with Witkoff—you see Trump using Witkoff for the Iran deal partly because he doesn’t seem to trust more, you know, traditional Republican advisors to get the solution he wants. Does anyone have any thoughts about that? About—almost it seems like Trump’s using—I don’t know. Anyhow, if you have thoughts on that. He seems to have pushed out kind of traditional Republican advisors. And that partly seems why they have a staffing shortage. And they—you know, the people—the career people in the department, you know, a lot of them worked on the deals under the Obama administration. So it seems like they—you know, is this basically Trump cover for a basically Obama-type deal? Or—anyhow, I’m interested in your thoughts on that.  

PANDITH: Thank you, Laura. Elliott, do you want to take that? 

ABRAMS: Well, there’s two separate questions here, I think. One, the staffing, I think that’s right. Trump, when he came in the first time, had no people, really. So he had all the generals and he had people from previous Republican administrations. It’s different now. That’s not happening. And he’s brought in some of his own people, Witkoff as an example, and excluded many people who—many Republicans from the administration. Which creates a problem at NSC, at State, and at DOD on staffing. 

Now, is he going to end up with JCPOA two? Maybe. If you think of his denunciations of NAFTA, then they renegotiated the MCA, which is not night and day different. It’s better, but it’s not night and day. And I wouldn’t be surprised if we saw something like that, a deal that looks a lot like the JCPOA but it’s twenty-five years, not fifteen. The president is going to need some provisions on which he can hang his hat and claim, no, this is completely different. Whether it’ll be different—again, assuming there is a deal—that’s a different question. And you know, the enemy gets a vote. I mean, would the Iranians agree to a very different deal? 

TAKEYH: I’ll just say one thing—sorry—just one thing about this. I don’t think there’s a JCPOA 2 coming alone. I think you may have a series of interim agreements that deal with aspects of the program, but not kind of the totality of it. 

There’s been a lot of discussions, I think rather a correct one, about the Iranian vulnerabilities, as indicated by Israeli successes. Those vulnerabilities and Israeli successes have not translated into different negotiating positions by the Iranians. So whatever—you know, again, do they see their vulnerabilities requiring to adjust their nuclear negotiation? At this point, that is not the case. So I don’t think they’re going to agree to another fifteen-, twenty-year sunset deal or whatever it is. But I think you can get an agreement on 60 percent this and that, and so forth, something with Director General Grossi and so forth. And this itself will take two, three years to negotiate. 

PANDITH: Thank you. 

COOK: Let me just quickly fire— 

PANDITH: Steven, yes. 

COOK: If you don’t mind. 

PANDITH: No, please. 

COOK: You know, I know that when Waltz was pushed out—and why he was pushed out I’m not sure anybody really knows for sure—there was sort of like a disturbance in the force in Washington. Everybody kind of—and then the parlor games began: Who’s going to be the next national security advisor? It’s not obvious to me that the president wants or needs a national security advisor. He’s got his golf partner and real estate executive Steve Witkoff, who has essentially been the national security advisor. Doesn’t seem like either the president or Witkoff need a lot of preparation, and think that they can do a deal very quickly. And whether it is incrementally better than a JCPOA or not, they will sell it that way—(laughs)—because that is the way he goes about it. 

I will say this just to Ray’s last point. Here in Muscat, there’s a general sense that there is going to be a deal and that it’s—they’re pretty bullish on it and see the speed with which this is happening as an indication that both parties are eager to have a deal. 

PANDITH: Thank you. 

We have about five minutes left, just for everybody to note. Monica, if we could take the last question, please. 

OPERATOR: We’ll take the next question from Trudy Rubin. 

Q: Hello, everyone. 

Do you think, given what we see with this trip, that the idea of a deal in Gaza is finished? And can the Saudis go along with that? And if it’s finished, and Netanyahu and his far-right ministers can go along in their current direction, what happens then? Because the population squeeze there and the humanitarian issue is getting so dire that it looks like something has to explode. And if there’s no political horizon out there—just half-baked ideas of food distribution—when does this thing blow up? 

PANDITH: Thank you so much, Trudy. 

ABRAMS: Yeah. I’d say I don’t think it’s going to blow up for political reasons. I think there’s going to be a deal on food. There are news stories today about David Beasley, former head of the World Food Programme, leading a kind of international effort that the United States would support that would arrange for food deliveries into Gaza that would be protected by private security companies. There are many ways of doing it. 

I think my criticism would be that since October 7 the United States under Biden and Trump has really not put forward a workable plan for Gaza, which we could have done and should have done. Now maybe there is one, whether it’s going to be called an American plan or not. I think there will be some kind of international humanitarian effort. 

The problem with that effort is it doesn’t address the security problem. It addresses the problem with security for food deliveries, but not the overall Gaza security problem, which is landing in the lap of the Israelis partly because nobody else really wants to take the responsibility and risk of taking it on. 

PANDITH: Thank you. Does anybody else want to comment on this? 

COOK: Well, just that I— 

PANDITH: Please go ahead. 

COOK: Sure. Just that it—clearly, when the president responded to a reporter’s question the other day about this issue, it wasn’t just a kind of off the hand—you know, off the cuff, yes, we need to do something for the Palestinians; the United States is actually engaged in this issue. But providing aid to Gaza is important, but it doesn’t, as Elliot said—to underline his point—doesn’t address the underlying issue. And it seems to me that without a plan the Israelis are going to undertake their own plan, which is to put as much pressure on Hamas as possible. And that includes taking territory now. 

PANDITH: Great. 

I’m going to ask Monica for another question, please. 

OPERATOR: We will continue to take one to two more questions. We’ll take the next question from Ira Stoll. 

Q: Hi. Thanks. 

Is there any chance the Saudis or the UAE might be—Ira Stoll from the Editors—any chance the Saudis or the UAE might be able to talk Trump out of a bad Iran deal? I mean, after all, they don’t want sanctions off Iran and an enriched Shiite troublemaker across the Gulf from them pumping oil and lowering their prices, or— 

PANDITH: Thank you, Ira. 

Ray, do you want to— 

TAKEYH: I’ll take a stab at that. I mean, Steven can speak about this because he’s in the region. 

There is a Gulf rapprochement with Iran. The Saudis are doing it and others are doing it. Now, that may be because they anticipate that there’s going to be an American—(laughs)—opening to Iran, and they don’t want to get in front of it, or behind it, or left behind as a result of that. Will President Trump listen to the Saudis on this? Yeah, I mean, I have no idea. But the other side of the Gulf seems to be in more of an accommodationist mood at this point, at least in terms of their diplomatic outreach. The Saudi defense minister was in Iran and actually had a meeting with Ali Khamenei. So there is movement on that place, which may be their perception of American wobbliness. 

PANDITH: Steven? 

COOK: Yeah, there’s been a—there’s been a very significant rapprochement between the UAE and Iran. The Emiratis have invested a lot in Iran. Same thing with the Saudis. And more to come. 

I think those countries believe that there’s less neuralgia about a nuclear deal now, although there still is concern about sanctions relief and where it will go. But after the damage done to Hamas, Hezbollah, not as much to the Houthis—they’re hoping for more—and other components of the Axis of Resistance, it’s—the sanctions relief is less of a concern to them, but that’s not to say it’s not. 

But I agree with Ray. The president has come to office determined to get a deal with the Iranians. And Elliott has explained time and again from his perspective from Trump’s first administration that he was determined to get a deal. Maximum pressure was intended to bring the Iranians back to the negotiating table. So regardless of what the Saudis and Emiratis might be telling the president and the people around him, I think that the president has made the decision that that’s what he wants to do. 

PANDITH: Monica, we can take another one. 

OPERATOR: We’ll take the next question from Tom Cohen (sp). 

Q: Thank you very much. Thank you for this superb program. Hopefully, you can hear me. 

PANDITH: Yeah. 

Q: I wonder if you could talk about what is really going on in the U.S.-Israeli relations right now. How much of a breach is there and as a result of it how successful can Trump be in putting pressure on Israel vis-à-vis Gaza? 

PANDITH: Who would like— 

ABRAMS: I’ll take a crack. 

I wouldn’t call it a breach. I think tensions rise and fall under every president—literally, every president. There’s a concentration now because there may be disagreements about Gaza and Iran particularly and the Houthis at exactly the same time. 

On Gaza, the United States can exercise pressure but as with any of these countries no regime, no administration, no government is going to commit suicide because the president asked them to, and Netanyahu is not going to do things for Gaza or about Gaza that he believes will bring his government down. 

So this is—this may be a moment of tension. If we have a way of getting food in they’ll accept that as, you know, a fine thing to do. I think they don’t Gaza as existential. They view Iran as existential and they’re trying to keep their eye on that ball. 

PANDITH: Steven or Ray, do you want to say anything on this question? 

I’m going to turn it to Monica but I’m also going to thank everybody. I’m going to be jumping off quietly and Ben is going to take my place. 

So, Monica, please take the next question. 

COOK: Thanks, Farah. Good to see you. 

OPERATOR: We’ll take the next question from Dr. Azza Karam. 

Q: Hello. Greetings to all. Thank you very much for an excellent panel. I’m Azza Karam. I’m president and CEO of Lead Integrity, which is a global policy think tank and consultancy. I’m based right now for the time being in Cairo for the next few weeks, and I’ve been following events very carefully. 

I’m curious as to two things. One is your opinion on the position of the—of Egypt vis-à-vis what you’ve been mentioning. There’s been heavy emphasis, obviously, on the Gulf for good reason but I’m curious how you see the role of the Egyptian government in the midst of all this. 

But I’m also keen to just—in addition to thanking and emphasizing just a point that Steven made about the Houthis seeming to have a collective amnesia about what they’re doing. I think it’s much more smart than that. I think it’s about also rephrasing actions for nonstate actors in the region in terms of Gaza and the implications of Gaza. So it’s a strategic rephrasing, obviously, to their own advantage, not so much an amnesia. Thank you. 

COOK: I’ll take both questions. 

When I was talking about a collective amnesia I wasn’t talking about the Houthis. I was talking about my Omani interlocutors in particularly, who had forgotten about the attacks on shipping prior to October 7. Of course, the Houthis know exactly what they’re doing and they’re not engaged in any kind of amnesia.  

On Cairo, look, there is, clearly, a reason why the president is not going to Egypt. There has been a significant power shift in the region that has been underway for the better part of the last decade, especially as Egypt has lurched from crisis to crisis as its economy has deteriorated because of the bad decisions of its leadership. 

Egypt is always going to be very, very important but it really is unable to project power, and kind of the one issue that is left for the Egyptians, which is Gaza negotiating a cease fire, the Egyptians have been left with the short straw. They’re the ones who are supposed to wrangle Hamas in Gaza and get them to agree. That is probably the worst job among many terrible jobs in the Middle East. 

And so the Egyptians really don’t have a role to play in the nuclear negotiations. One would think that they would be more concerned and more active on the Houthi front given the fact that the Houthis’ ability to close the Red Sea has a very significant impact on Suez Canal tolls. 

But they, too, have amnesia. They have blamed—they have said that the problems in the Red Sea fall squarely of the shoulders of the Israelis. 

So Egypt is, you know, now sitting on the sidelines and is observing what’s happening in the region rather than shaping the region as Egyptians like to tell themselves that they do. 

CHANG: Thanks, Steven. 

Monica, we’ll take one last question. 

OPERATOR: We’ll take the last question from Bernard Haykel. 

Q: Hi. Bernard Haykel, Princeton University. Thank you very much for your comments.  

I just wanted to ask one question and make one comment. I think the comment and the reason for the détente between the Gulf countries and Iran has to do with the fact that Iran’s ability to hit the Gulf countries with power in the Persian Gulf is undiminished, and in an attack on Iran that is existentially threatening to the regime the Iranians will attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE and have made that intention very clear, which is why they have—which is why the Saudis now want the Iranians—a deal with the Iranians. 

The question has to do with oil. I didn’t hear you talk about oil at all with this—you know, with the trip. Do you think that energy and oil has—factors at all in this presidential visit to the Gulf? 

ABRAMS: Well, I’d say I think, certainly, the amount of pumping that the Saudis are doing is going to come up and the Saudis, as you well know, Bernie, don’t do very well when oil is selling at 60 (dollars) or $70 a barrel. They need significantly more than that to balance their budget. 

So I would imagine—I was going to say oil supplies are likely to come up. You never quite know, I would say, with this administration. Who is going with the president on this trip? Will he have the Treasury secretary or, you know, the secretary of energy or the secretary of the interior? Who will—from our point of view who is going to raise this? 

I think from the president’s point of view he’ll say some things about how we don’t need anybody’s oil and we’re the greatest producer. But he wants oil prices to remain low. He needs them to remain low because if he’s going to be imposing significant tariffs with a risk of inflation he doesn’t want oil prices rising in the same time period. 

COOK: Of course, it’s a double-edged sword for him as well as for the Saudis. The Saudis can capture market share with low oil prices. They’ll never make up in market share what they need in high oil prices but it does have an impact on American producers and those Americans employed in the oil patch. 

So it is a double-edged sword for him to demand these low oil prices. I put the Saudi pumping in the category of, one, capturing market share, doing damage to American industry, but also doing Trump a favor so that when there is tension if there should be tension between the Kingdom and the Trump administration the Saudis will be somewhat insulated from it by doing a variety of solids for the president early on in his administration. 

CHANG: All right. With that, unless another panelist wants to weigh in, let me thank everyone for attending this briefing to preview the president’s trip to the Middle East. 

To our panelists, thank you for your time, wisdom, and insights. To our attendees, please continue to tune in to CFR events and go to CFR.org for resources on these issues and many more. 

Everyone have a good rest of your day. Steven, safe travels, and thanks again. 

ABRAMS: Thank you. 

COOK: Thank you. 

(END)