What Trump’s Appointments Tell Us About His Asia Policy

During the U.S. presidential campaign, President Donald Trump generally took a tough line toward China. Yet at the same time, he often complained about some of the United States’ most important partners in the region—countries that have been critical in dealing with Beijing.

Trump promised to impose tariffs of 60 percent on all Chinese exports and to boost the U.S. defense budget, focusing it more on Asia and possibly less on Europe, including Ukraine.

But he also wants Taiwan to pay for U.S. protection of the island democracy and for Taipei to pay more for its defense. Trump is making these demands even though his first administration had taken some of the most assertive moves to demonstrate U.S. support for Taiwan of any administration in history.

Since bilateral trade balances are central to Trump’s foreign-policy mindset, the fact that some major Asian exporters, who are also U.S. partners, run sizable trade surpluses with the United States could impact Trump 2.0’s Asia policy.

Trump’s Asia-related appointments at the Cabinet secretary level and below demonstrate some of this incoherence in Asia policy. And Trump himself, now president, continues to hammer home his anger about U.S. trade deficits.

The businessman-turned-politician has already petrified Asian partners (and those in North America, too) who run trade surpluses with the United States. As I noted in a recent post for the Council on Foreign Relations, Vietnam has the third-largest trade surplus of any country with America, partly because of the first-term Trump policies that pushed investors into Vietnam.

Vietnamese officials clearly fear that the trade surplus will lead Trump 2.0 to slap tariffs on their country or force them to buy large amounts of U.S. goods like liquefied natural gas—something that Hanoi may not need or cannot acquire fast enough.

South Korea also has a mounting trade surplus with the United States. Seoul is already developing a plan to buy more U.S. goods in a second Trump term to avoid facing tariffs.

Similarly, as my colleague Matthew Goodman has noted, some Japanese officials fear that Japan’s trade surplus with the United States, which has grown in recent years, will lead Trump to impose tariffs on Tokyo. In his first term, he repeatedly complained about Japan’s trade surplus.

And while leaders from Vietnam, South Korea, and Japan were among the most skillful in managing Trump in his first term—particularly former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, probably the world leader who worked best with Trump—it may be more challenging for the three current leaders to advance their interests.

South Korean politics are in turmoil, Vietnam’s new leadership is just getting used to its ties to Washington and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba is in a much weaker political position to deal with Trump than Abe was.

Yet in the end, the big Asian trade exporters, unlike Canada and Mexico, which also are on the president’s tariff list, may be saved by the overriding concern about China that links many top Trump appointees.

Indeed, they may be saved from major economic measures by the fact that Trump has already appointed so many people to Cabinet positions and deputy positions who are focused on combating China and recognize they need U.S. partners in Asia to do so.

Overall, Trump’s second-term foreign policy, defense, and economic appointments suggest that security issues will dominate in Asia, despite his grumbling about trade imbalances. In addition, they suggest that his second administration will be even tougher toward China than his first, or than the Biden administration.

To be sure, Trump has appointed a few officials who seem dedicated to widespread tariffs, like economic adviser Peter Navarro, who also served in his first term.

Yet they are counterbalanced by several mainstream Republican economic appointees, like the nominee for the head of the White House National Economic Council, Kevin Hassett. Hassett is well-received by both Republicans and Democrats and in the past, has warned that tariffs actually can undermine economic growth. In addition, there are many more appointees who are focused on security in Asia and will see that slapping tariffs on key partners undermines the creation of a coalition of countries working to limit some of Beijing’s actions.

For instance, the nominee for ambassador to the United Nations, Rep. Elise Stefanik, is known for being extremely tough on China. Similarly, the nominee for secretary of state, Florida Sen. Marco Rubio, is one of the biggest China hawks in the Senate, having authored legislation sanctioning China for its treatment of Hong Kong. Rubio also served as co-chair of a major congressional commission that monitors human rights concerns, bilateral economic and security challenges, and other U.S. issues with China.

Rubio also often has spoken of the need for the United States to work closely with partners in Asia to combat China’s regional security assertiveness, growing military presence and efforts, and economic coercion.

Trump has also picked Mike Waltz, a former Florida representative, as his national security adviser, a position usually best able to influence the president’s thinking on foreign policy. Waltz is, if it is even possible, even tougher on China than Rubio. The former congressman and U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, as The Economist noted, co-wrote an essay just before last November’s presidential election arguing that “a second Trump administration should quickly wind up the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, to free up military assets to confront and deter China.” Waltz also openly has called for the United States to provide even more military assistance to Taiwan, openly fearing that China will invade soon, and has called the Asian giant an “existential threat” to the United States.

Below this highest level of Cabinet officials—the people who often actually make policy in Washington—are thinkers seeded throughout who are tough on China and committed to a security-first view of Asia.

These include, as one example, Elbridge Colby, nominated to be the top official in the Pentagon on policy issues. Colby has had a singular focus on China for many years, long urging U.S. policymakers to increase their focus on security in Asia, even at the expense of some traditional ties in Europe.

Colby is just one of many senior appointees in the departments of Defense, State, and other agencies just below Cabinet level who argue that the United States should do more to counter China and needs Asian partners to achieve such a goal.

As the appointment process rolls on, guided now by both transition leaders and some of the top appointees themselves, expect even more such figures to emerge.

Trump may style himself as a transactional realist in foreign policy, averse to conflict. In many cases, he fits this bill. But with China (and thus Asia more broadly), his initial and coming appointments suggest that he will make an exception for bilateral relations with Beijing—an exception that will force his administration to keep many of the Asian partnerships solidified in the Biden years.