The Dangers of Democratic Backsliding in Georgia
from Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy
from Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy

The Dangers of Democratic Backsliding in Georgia

Supporters of the Georgian Dream coalition gather outside the central election commission to wait for official results in Tbilisi.
Supporters of the Georgian Dream coalition gather outside the central election commission to wait for official results in Tbilisi. David Mdzinarishvili/REUTERS

Georgia was once a beacon of democracy in the South Caucasus, but today it is backsliding toward authoritarianism and headed back into Russia's sphere of influence. 

June 21, 2023 9:37 am (EST)

Supporters of the Georgian Dream coalition gather outside the central election commission to wait for official results in Tbilisi.
Supporters of the Georgian Dream coalition gather outside the central election commission to wait for official results in Tbilisi. David Mdzinarishvili/REUTERS
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Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

Once seen as a model for democratic transition among former Soviet states and a leader in Euro-Atlantic integration, the South Caucasian country of Georgia is at risk of democratic backsliding, potentially forfeiting its chance to become a candidate for European Union (EU) membership. With the world’s attention focused on Ukraine, Russian influence in the country is increasing, despite strong public support for EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. The United States and the European Union should increase pressure on Georgian lawmakers—through financial assistance to Georgia and the EU candidate perspective—to reverse the trend of democratic backsliding and growing Russian influence in the country ahead of the October 2024 parliamentary elections. Otherwise, a slide toward authoritarianism in Georgia sets a dangerous precedent across Eastern Europe and beyond.

Democratic Backsliding

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Hopes for a successful democratic transformation in Georgia have slowly faded over the past decade and concerns over democratic decline have increased, particularly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A survey conducted in March 2022 found that 41 percent of Georgians felt that democracy had regressed over the past year. The country’s ruling party, Georgian Dream, has been accused of expanding control over state institutions and security forces, infringing on civil society work and independent media, committing election malpractice (such as voter intimidation, vote-buying, exerting pressure on candidates and voters, and encouraging an uneven playing field), and applying selective justice. The party won the last three parliamentary elections since 2012 largely because of widespread disapproval of former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s misconduct during the later years of his presidency. However, the imprisonment and illness of the former reformist leader, who is being held at a Tbilisi hospital and has called himself a “political prisoner,” is seen as a metaphor for the state of democracy in Georgia. Expectations for greater accountability, transparency, and less oligarchic influence in Georgian politics have not been realized. The founder of Georgian Dream—the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili who made his fortune in Russia—continues to wield excessive political influence in Georgia, even though he no longer holds any official role. One of his primary objectives was to normalize relations with Moscow, and he still maintains business ties to Russia.

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Georgia’s democratic backsliding has undermined its path to EU membership. Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia left around 20 percent of Georgia’s territory under Russian control and pushed public opinion in favor of the EU. Once a frontrunner in the “Association Trio” of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—all countries that have signed association agreements with the European Union, facilitating trade and visa-free travel—Georgia did not receive EU candidate status in July 2022 when Moldova and Ukraine were granted candidacy. Instead, the EU provided Georgia with twelve priorities the country needs to address, including strengthening judicial and media independence and combating the country’s oligarchic tendencies. The EU will vote on Georgia’s candidacy status again in December 2023. Yet, while 88 percent of Georgians support EU membership, Georgia appears to be moving further away from democratic norms and EU values.

A Failed “Foreign Agent” Law

In March 2023, the Georgian government introduced a “foreign agent” law, which would have forced any organization that receives over 20 percent of its funding from foreign entities to register as a foreign agent. The government claims that the law sought to address “transparency and foreign influence.” However, the legislation mimics Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2012 foreign agent law, which was a critical turning point toward authoritarianism in Russia. After tens of thousands of protestors gathered in Tbilisi in response to the bill, the parliament withdrew the legislation, which would have targeted civil society organizations, corruption watchdogs, and independent media. However, it is possible that Georgian Dream will attempt to pass a similar law in the future.

Russia’s Bid for Influence

Paradoxically, the legacy of Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008 has led Georgian Dream to pursue only lukewarm support for Ukraine in its 2022 war against Russia—partly out of a sense of vulnerability. However, the government has at the same time allowed Russia to increase its influence in Georgia. Nearly 90 percent of Georgians support Ukraine and a majority believes Russia and Putin are responsible for the war. Yet the government failed to join Western-led sanctions against Russia and has kept its distance from Kyiv. Voices close to Georgian Dream have accused the West of attempting to draw Georgia into the war in Ukraine. Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili has blamed NATO expansion and Ukraine’s desire to join as one of the main reasons for the war.

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Georgia has also acted as a throughway for Western goods to reach Russia. Trade between Russia and Georgia has increased by more than 20 percent since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Cargo transit between Turkey and Russia (a large amount of which was transported through Georgia) tripled during the first six months of 2022. The Georgian government claims it is abiding by international sanctions imposed against Russia despite the increase in trade. In May 2023, Putin issued a decree allowing Georgians to travel to Russia without a visa and lifted a 2019 ban on Russian airlines operating direct flights from Georgia to Russia. This drew heavy criticism from the United States and the EU, as well as from the Georgian people, but the government defended the move.

Keeping Georgia on Track

The United States and the European Union need to work together to increase pressure on Georgian lawmakers ahead of the December vote on the country’s EU candidacy and the October 2024 parliamentary elections. The European Parliament has called for the European Council to sanction Ivanishvili for his role in “the deterioration of the political process in Georgia” and to release Saakashvili for proper medical treatment. The United States has sanctioned four current and former Georgian judges for corruption and abuses of power that have undermined public trust in the judiciary. If the domestic situation in Georgia does not improve, the EU and the United States can condition future assistance to Georgia on stopping democratic backsliding.

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The future of Georgia is relevant beyond the borders of the small South Caucasian nation, and is linked to Ukraine’s war. Success in Ukraine would demonstrate that an alternative future out of Russia’s shadow is possible. Yet, democratic failure in Georgia would be a painful illustration that even a country once seemingly irreversibly on the path toward democracy and Euro-Atlantic integration can slide back into autocracy and succumb again to Russia’s sphere of influence.

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Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Sign up to receive CFR President Mike Froman’s analysis on the most important foreign policy story of the week, delivered to your inbox every Friday afternoon. Subscribe to The World This Week. In the Middle East, Israel and Iran are engaged in what could be the most consequential conflict in the region since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. CFR’s experts continue to cover all aspects of the evolving conflict on CFR.org. While the situation evolves, including the potential for direct U.S. involvement, it is worth touching on another recent development in the region which could have far-reaching consequences: the diffusion of cutting-edge U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) technology to leading Gulf powers. The defining feature of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy is his willingness to question and, in many cases, reject the prevailing consensus on matters ranging from European security to trade. His approach to AI policy is no exception. Less than six months into his second term, Trump is set to fundamentally rewrite the United States’ international AI strategy in ways that could influence the balance of global power for decades to come. In February, at the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit in Paris, Vice President JD Vance delivered a rousing speech at the Grand Palais, and made it clear that the Trump administration planned to abandon the Biden administration’s safety-centric approach to AI governance in favor of a laissez-faire regulatory regime. “The AI future is not going to be won by hand-wringing about safety,” Vance said. “It will be won by building—from reliable power plants to the manufacturing facilities that can produce the chips of the future.” And as Trump’s AI czar David Sacks put it, “Washington wants to control things, the bureaucracy wants to control things. That’s not a winning formula for technology development. We’ve got to let the private sector cook.” The accelerationist thrust of Vance and Sacks’s remarks is manifesting on a global scale. Last month, during Trump’s tour of the Middle East, the United States announced a series of deals to permit the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia to import huge quantities (potentially over one million units) of advanced AI chips to be housed in massive new data centers that will serve U.S. and Gulf AI firms that are training and operating cutting-edge models. These imports were made possible by the Trump administration’s decision to scrap a Biden administration executive order that capped chip exports to geopolitical swing states in the Gulf and beyond, and which represents the most significant proliferation of AI capabilities outside the United States and China to date. The recipe for building and operating cutting-edge AI models has a few key raw ingredients: training data, algorithms (the governing logic of AI models like ChatGPT), advanced chips like Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) or Tensor Processing Units (TPUs)—and massive, power-hungry data centers filled with advanced chips.  Today, the United States maintains a monopoly of only one of these inputs: advanced semiconductors, and more specifically, the design of advanced semiconductors—a field in which U.S. tech giants like Nvidia and AMD, remain far ahead of their global competitors. To weaponize this chokepoint, the first Trump administration and the Biden administration placed a series of ever-stricter export controls on the sale of advanced U.S.-designed AI chips to countries of concern, including China.  The semiconductor export control regime culminated in the final days of the Biden administration with the rollout of the Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, more commonly known as the AI diffusion rule—a comprehensive global framework for limiting the proliferation of advanced semiconductors. The rule sorted the world into three camps. Tier 1 countries, including core U.S. allies such as Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, were exempt from restrictions, whereas tier 3 countries, such as Russia, China, and Iran, were subject to the extremely stringent controls. The core controversy of the diffusion rule stemmed from the tier 2 bucket, which included some 150 countries including India, Mexico, Israel, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Many tier 2 states, particularly Gulf powers with deep economic and military ties to the United States, were furious.  The rule wasn’t just a matter of how many chips could be imported and by whom. It refashioned how the United States could steer the distribution of computing resources, including the regulation and real-time monitoring of their deployment abroad and the terms by which the technologies can be shared with third parties. Proponents of the restrictions pointed to the need to limit geopolitical swing states’ access to leading AI capabilities and to prevent Chinese, Russian, and other adversarial actors from accessing powerful AI chips by contracting cloud service providers in these swing states.  However, critics of the rule, including leading AI model developers and cloud service providers, claimed that the constraints would stifle U.S. innovation and incentivize tier 2 countries to adopt Chinese AI infrastructure. Moreover, critics argued that with domestic capital expenditures on AI development and infrastructure running into the hundreds of billions of dollars in 2025 alone, fresh capital and scale-up opportunities in the Gulf and beyond represented the most viable option for expanding the U.S. AI ecosystem. This hypothesis is about to be tested in real time. In May, the Trump administration killed the diffusion rule, days before it would have been set into motion, in part to facilitate the export of these cutting-edge chips abroad to the Gulf powers. This represents a fundamental pivot for AI policy, but potentially also in the logic of U.S. grand strategy vis-à-vis China. The most recent era of great power competition, the Cold War, was fundamentally bipolar and the United States leaned heavily on the principle of non-proliferation, particularly in the nuclear domain, to limit the possibility of new entrants. We are now playing by a new set of rules where the diffusion of U.S. technology—and an effort to box out Chinese technology—is of paramount importance. Perhaps maintaining and expanding the United States’ global market share in key AI chokepoint technologies will deny China the scale it needs to outcompete the United States—but it also introduces the risk of U.S. chips falling into the wrong hands via transhipment, smuggling, and other means, or being co-opted by authoritarian regimes for malign purposes.  Such risks are not illusory: there is already ample evidence of Chinese firms using shell entities to access leading-edge U.S. chips through cloud service providers in Southeast Asia. And Chinese firms, including Huawei, were important vendors for leading Gulf AI firms, including the UAE’s G-42, until the U.S. government forced the firm to divest its Chinese hardware as a condition for receiving a strategic investment from Microsoft in 2024. In the United States, the ability to build new data centers is severely constrained by complex permitting processes and limited capacity to bring new power to the grid. What the Gulf countries lack in terms of semiconductor prowess and AI talent, they make up for with abundant capital, energy, and accommodating regulations. The Gulf countries are well-positioned for massive AI infrastructure buildouts. The question is simply, using whose technology—American or Chinese—and on what terms? In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it will be American technology for now. The question remains whether the diffusion of the most powerful dual-use technologies of our day will bind foreign users to the United States and what impact it will have on the global balance of power.  We welcome your feedback on this column. Let me know what foreign policy issues you’d like me to address next by replying to [email protected].